EC43 CHURCHES OF THE THIRD WORLD Mr. Moffett

INTRODUCTION

The title of this course is CHURCHES OF THE THIRD WORLD. I am not entirely happy with the term "third world", but it is the most common designation now for that part of the world, east and south, which is to be distinguished from "the west" and largely the north, that is, the industrialized nations of the "first world" (Europe and North America), and the "second world" (the communist bloc). You will easily think of exceptions and objections to such a categorization, but it is roughly what we think of when the newspapers and the United Nations talk of the "third world"; is Asia, Africa and Latin America. 43

EC 43 3rd Wild Church

But the course is about the <u>Churches</u> of the third world. It is about what Archbishop Temple some years ago, in a famous speech given at his enthronement as the Archbishop of Canterbury, called "the great new fact of our" age. I quote it regularly in the introductory course on mission and ecumenics, but it belongs also inseparably in any introduction to a course on the churches of the third world. I make no apology for repeating it for>it highlights the global importance as well as the significance in Christian mission of the rise of what he called the "younger churchers" and what we now more often call the "churches of the third world".

This is what William Temple said at Canterbury. The year was 1942, and the clouds of war were rolling over Europe:

"The world," he said, "is learning its helplessness apart from God though not yet is it on any great scale turning to Him for direction or for strength... rather is it towards more intense and fiercer competition, conflict and war between larger and ever larger concentrations of power...

"But there is another side to the picture. As though in preparation for such a time as this, God has been building up a Christian fellowship which now extends into almost every nation, and binds citizens of them all together in true unity and mutual love. No human agency has planned this. It is the result of the great missionary enterprise of the last hundred and fifty years. Neither the missionaries nor those who sent them out were aiming at the creation of a world-wide fellowship, interpenetrating the nations, bridging the gulfs between them, and supplying the promise of a check to their rivalries. The aim for nearly the whole period was to preach the gospel to as many individuals as could be reached so that those who were won to discipleship should be put in the way of eternal salvation. Almost incidentally the great world fellowship is arisen; it is the great new fact of our era.."

(The Church Looks Forward, p.1-3)

What makes it a new fact is that the spreading growth and vitality of the churches of the third world have in the 20th century for the first time in 2,000 years made Christianity a truly universal faith. For the first time in history there is now no single nation in the world without at least a handful of Christians in it. There are still a few small countries which have never had an organized church. And there are some larger ones like North Korea which once had a church in every city but where now not one single organized church remains, so far as we know. But only two countries in the world, according to the World Christian Encyclopedia (pp. 800f.) have no organized church, and in both countries there are isolated, perhaps hidden Christians. Those two are North Korea (pop. 148 million) and Mongolia (pop. 1 million). Some would now add Albania (pop. almost 3 million).

The went fine of only

At the end of World War II, in 1945, two-thirds of all Korea's Christians were in the north. Today there is no record of an organized, recognized church there, though one may soon be allowed. "Mongolia was entered by Roman Catholic missionaries in the 13th century, 600 years ago, and by Nestorian missionaries even before that, but when the Protestant missionary James Gilmour entered Mongolia in 1871 he could find no believers there, and when he left 21 years later after incredible hardships and heroic labors there were still no Mongolian Christians. He had worked for 21 years without a single baptism. (p. 495). As for Albania, the Eastern Orthodox Church seems to have survived the oppressions of the world's cruelest communist regime, but is under harsh and rigid control. There are no Protestants to report, though for a short while a Baptist pastor managed to gather a group of about 20 converts together. The last three Roman Catholic bishops disappeared without a trace in 1977. (p. 135).

All the other countries of the world, however, have an organized church. The church at last has circled the globe and however inadequately has "proclaimed the gospel to every nation". We shall later have to take another look at that. The Bible doesn't quite say "every nation". What Jesus commanded it to do in the Great Commission was "make disciples of panta ta ethne" (Takta ta tota)) which could be more accurately translated "make disciples of every ethnic group" which is quite different and should rid us of the comfortable notion that the church's global task of evangelism, to say nothing of its broader responsibilities, is still unfinished. India, for example, is one nation, but it has 3000 ethnic groups. (McGavran, Ethnic Realities, p. 18)

What Is the Third World? But Before we look more closely at the churches, let me return for a moment to the question with which we started. What is the "third world"? I said I wasn't too happy with the term. Why? Primarily because it doesn't quite fit. I am going to use it because the alternatives are even more awkward. "Two-thirds world"? That's what some people call it, and if you think only in numbers it's reasonably accurate. But it's clumsy, and the world is made up of more than numbers. "Lafricasia"? That's even clumsier, although a great missiologist, Donald McGavran likes to use it, and it does at least describe what we usually mean: Latin America, Africa and Asia, as the "third world". So for want of a better term, I will use "third world",

)

remembering that "third" in the dictionary doesn't necessary mean <u>less</u> than first or second, or not as important as first and second. One of the dictionary meanings of "third" is simply "one of three", and that is how I will use it.

So what is this "third world"? Ten years ago or more when the term "third world" was fairly new and becoming increasingly popular, the news magazine U.S. News and World Report (March 31, 1975) tried to explain to its readers what "third world" really means. It listed seven characteristics which make the "third world" what it is, and those seven are worth repeating. The article said that 1) the "third world" is not an organization; 2) in numbers of people it is a majority of the world's population; 3) it is economically poor; 4) it is emotionally convinced that it has been cheated by the rich; 5) geographically, in general it is the southern half of the earth; 6) racially, it is the darker-skinned peoples of the world; and 7) politically, it tries hard and rather unsuccessfully to be neutral in the worldwide power struggle that divides the first world from the second world, the democracies from the communists. Let me elaborate a little on these seven points, which are more true than false but never altogether true nor altogether false.

1. Is the third world unorganized? Yes. There is no overall alliance of third world nations. Their only global forum of intenational communication is the United Nations, which is why the UN is very precious to them, and why so many are desperately dismayed by its decline. Did you see in this week's papers that the Gen. Secretary of the UN, Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru, was so pessimistic about the UN's future that like Winston Churchill who declared he was not about to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire, he (Perez de Cuellar) said "I don't see any reason why I should preside over the collaps of [the United Nations]. I don't have to..die with my ship". To the big nations the UN seems unrealistically in the control of little nations without power; and to the little nations, the UN doesn't seem to be able to help them when they most need help, as Mrs. Aquino quite rightly and pointedly noted yesterday. But where would the third world have a world forum for its views without the UN? It's their only structure with a global voice.

2. Is the third world the world of the majority? Yes. It really is the "two-thirds world" in numbers of people. If you doubt that, look at the population of the continents. The third world's Asia has 60% of all the people in the world; the first world's North America has only 6%. It is the population factor that is the third world's only realistic claim to global power. It is what enables it to dominate discussion in the UN, much to the annoyance of the first and second worlds. But population has only a fragile hold on power. Population is as much a minus as a plus in today's tragically overpopulated world.

3

But In the time being I at heast in the first separat g this course, I want to think of the their world, and und - a instance in time the third would defining q it, in terms of three categories : O Colon, @ Nation and @ Development. The UN (I Would Christian Trayclopaedie) analyzes the nations in two different ways -O First, by column is mayin groups (White, black, brown, ten + yellow). This is popul a activity lega, D Second by prolitical alignment in three groups: 1. Western wold - the so-called "first med". 35 comments. 2. Communist wold - the so-called "second world" 30 communist 3. The third wold - "the so-called "non-aligned networs" 158 communist 3 Fund by development. 1. More developed reprins 2. Less developed reprins 51 countres 172 countres If we measure the spread of Chustianty in the differing classif lating as get 950 :--The western untils 35 countres had 35 20 g the world's Chartering (547 m The community unlikes to contras had 18 To of the mild's Churtisme (250 the) But The third world's 158 compress had 99 to g the world's Christianie (657 m.) I. take at it pist by colon - which is how most of the und still pides juple. Who said Christianity was: a white monit religion? They say that the year 1981/82 In the prist time and the history the majority of the unld's Chustians have darher skin (black brown, & yellow - whatever you want to call the colors) - and white Christians are now, and probably

EC 43

Numb for a numerit about what this means for the would christian mussion in our time. Here are some brief thoughts. I. The old priver base of Christian mussions is erodup. Christianity from the time of the Reprintion (1500) to the 20th c. (1900) was exactly what the third - unld sometimes still calls it - "a" white man's religion". 2. But it isn't any longer. As of this year it is choir is darher than white.

4. This probably means a slift in the base of minim from the west to the third-und if Christianis are going to carry out the Biblical mondate of reaching the whole would with an a clean, effective presentation of the love and class of gens Christ.

3. The power base of missions will probably shift to the faster granting of peoples who are turning faster to find Jesus Christ as had a Savian than Atter - to black, yellows and born races of this would.

5. Therefore, in any planning for the future of the Churthan chuch al its would more it is absolutely importance that the 3rd would chuches because an indespensable part of the planning and operation for in the administration christian would mission. EC 43 - Entroduction

that we the the third-und churches it become an indrojensable part of our the planning and operation. Western planning for muld music, y it is done in isolation from the churches of the third und, is obsolete. Nothing but corporative und planning for would Christian mission in to in today's would. We live in a new pituation. $\overline{\mathbf{7}}$

I. But colom, as we know, is a very imperfect, highly stylized enterim for duriding the world's population into categories - thigh it is still one of the most prevalent. Aralter but usdely used category is political. the divide up the uned's population by compthies. Here to we find a starting change: - In Caregie day

If we measure the spread of Christianity politically by blocs of countries, as of 1980,

The Encyclopedies (p.3), 1 reporting on this distribution of the wold by communes, goes on to say that,

"In 73 g the mild's 223 comments, Churchains und form the majority (men 50%); in one-third Eq the uned's communes they are still a miniarty. This spreed is very uneven though (see Slobel Nep 1]. Christians number inder over 9070 in 100 communes; less than 1020 in 51 countries; less than 170 in 24 countries, and less than to g 190 in 6 countries: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Somelia, North Yemen and South Yemen." (p. 3).

I note that Nepel is classified as to y 12 Christian, but three hymies are as & a few years go. Today thanks to the how-key but amegrizely effective instress of the United Minim to Nepel in just the last three or from years, I think that Nepel, through still in the class of repuis where public everythin is absolutely publicden, has become at least more than 120 (not to 9 19.) Christian.

2/5/85

(8)

Inth

B. Introduction to the Third World Churches.

But it is the 3rd unld chundres which is the primary subject of two connece. So before we turn to continental surveys of Morian, letin American and Asian Christianity, let me make some preliminary observations about the situation of the churches in the third would. The part fait to conder First, how does the church compare the Christian church is extremely increasely due tributed in the third would. Its presider of the population on the two dweets presider of the population on the two dweets

Kns. p. 1) 93. 5% in the latin America (348,658,000 271,640,000) (9) 44.2 No in Africe (20'3 491,000 460, 857,000) (b) 5.190 m [2] 86,420 m Asia. (128,078,000 \$ 2,514,550,000) Oceania (20, 299,000 In other unds, comparing Asia and latin America the situation 23, 452, 000) - Wild in Ev, 10 782 ft. is practically minin-reversed. Latin America about 95% urminel Chustien; Asia about 9590 uninel un Chustien with Africe half-way between.

By way of companism, perhaps I should add 1st + 2nd would begines. -

(2) 88.3%	ĸ	North America	(219, 833,000	4	245 837 000)
(3) 85.4 90	m	Sunge	(415,601,000	7	486, 436,000)
5 36.1%	m	USSR	(96, 727,000	2	268, 115,000)

9.

EC 43

10

If we exclude largely Christian (technically Christian) latin America, and examine Asia and Africa a little none closely as to the religions situation on those two continents, it is better perhaps to divide them into three sections: Africe, South Asia and East Asia.

Africa is almost evenly divided between Churtisms and Muslimis, with Churthanis recartly having a slight edge. Bejore 1970 Muslimis had been in the majority. But in 1980 the statistics were Churtisms 203 million (203, 490,020) - 44,24, 4 Africa's population Muslimis 190 million (189, 725,020) - 41,240 ", ", Tribal religions by million (63, 872,020) - 13,9,90 ", ", (World kn. Suc., J. 782)

Moving east it across the Red See & Indian ocean with Asia, beginning with South Asia (which meludes the Asian Muddle Sost), the largest religious graping is Hundu, with Muslims second. In 1980 -

Hm dus Muslims	515	millin	(515,368,000) -	41.200
•	405	millin	(405,286,00) -	32.49
Buddhisti	139	4	(134, 598,000) -	9,470
Christians	109	11	(109,051,000) .	

East Asia, aparin, is very difficient. In 1952, by for the largest grouping called itally "non-religions". Non-religions STO multini (549,340,000) - 50.5% Chunic forlk-rel. 190 " (189,670,000) - 15.3% Buddhints 135 " (137,557,000) - 12.7% Athents 113 " (112,653,000) - 10.4%

New Religionsti Auslinis 34 millini (34, 291, 000) 3.2 M 22 million (21, 491,000) 2.0% Shannonists 13 milhin (13,055,000) 1-2-20 Christians 19 million (19.026,00) 1.8 %. Shomansts 13 " (13,058,000) 1.290

Confinction Shinto

0.5 0.3

		~			0.3	5 11 3, 1
Populations 1980. Aprice. [S. Asia S. Asia Asia E. M.	2,514	million million million - million -]			21°2,
Europe L. America	486	millim				
USSR	268	million				
N. America	249	millim				
O Ceama	24	million .	· (p. 780)	(18,4 m. in	Pristo/N2;	5 m. in the islands)

11.

EC Y3 Wind Kn Enc.

	ed's Cargest Protestant Churches. (Bu	rett, 19.	8¥]		+ /	3.1
	1. CHURCH OF CHRIST ZAIRE		Aduets	Alberry to	1951	1
1	2. ASSEMBLIES OF GUD, BRAZIL		519,499 _	4,728,280.		
5	3. [HILLIPPINE INDERGING DI		183,000 -	4,000,000	18	1 2
	3. [HILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH (AGURAY) 4. KIMBANGUIST CHURCH, ZAIRE		60,000	3,500,000	+ 1	1
	>5. ANGSICAN CHURCH NIGERIA	2,		3,500,000	+	
	>5. BNGSICAN CHURCH NIGERIA 6. PROTESTANT (REF.) CHURCH, INDONESIA 7. NIGERIA FERIOLUCIA		359,969 _	2, 142,000	10	(
	7. NIGERIA FELLOWSHIP & CHURCHES & CHRIST (SUM)	() . 4	187,000	1,958,710	+	1
	5. CHURCH of South INDIA		100,553	1,746,000	+	<u>ا</u>
	9 CHURCH OF CHRIST MANALISTA (PHILIDPINES		15,700 -	1,555,902	12	= 4
	10. ANELICAN CHURCH, VGANDA			1,500,000		
	11. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN KOREA HAPDONG		306,355	1,383,951	12	- 1
	12. ANELICAN CHURCH IN KOREA, HAPDONG 13. DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH, SOUTH AFRICA (WHITZ 14. COUNCIL of BODGICT ON)	27, 436	1,298,295		18
	14. COUNCIL of BAPTIST CHURCHES in N.S. INDIA		199,876	1, 200,000		
	14. COUNCIL of BAPTIST CHURCHES in N.E. INDIA 15. BAPTIST CONVENTION OF BRAZIL 16. BATAK CHRISTIAN PROTESTANT CHURCH, INDON. 17. PENTECOSTAL CHURCHER THE	· 2 3	30,200	1,064,990 1,050,000 1,044,382	4	10
	- 17. PENTECOSTAL CHURCHES & INDONESIA	() () () () () () () () () () () () () (65,457		- 5 -	- 5
	CONFREGATIONS CRISTA BRAZIL & PUBLET		50,000	1,000,000		+
	17. PREDISYTERIAN CHURCH OF KOREA TOUGHOD	2	00,000	1,000,000		- 9
	20 FUHNGELICAL VENTECOSTALS, BRAZIL FOR CHRIS	~ F 9	53,600	1,000,000		. 15
	- 21. JOUTH_AFRICAN_ METHODIST CHURCH		73.635	1.000,000		
	22. METHODIST CHURCH IN SOUTH ASIA		121,109	942,545		
	23 MADAGASCAR CHURCH OF JESUS CHOIST		50,000	901,306	_ 1	14
	- 29. OURMA BATTIST CONVENTION		48,966	881,487	0	
	25. UNITED EV. LUTHERAN CHS. IN INDIA	3:	39,690	798,560	8	13
	26. CHURCH 1 CENTRAL AFRICA, PRESBYTERIAN (MALAWI)		82,171	766,000	11	7
-	0 .			,,		7
	Rush 5	_				
10	Pent y					
-12 4	Ang Y Bari 2					
/	Bap _ 3			~		
	United 3 Indep 3					
	3 4					
	Method 2					

shrunk quickly and peacefully. And there are few signs yet that Russia's Communists have lost their will to rule.

The odds are that one or both gambles will fail. If so, Mr Gorbachev will be out. The main risk is that his careful compromises will be swept aside by new disciplinarians in the Kremlin. Theirs would be an appallingly difficult restoration. The sheer scale of change in Eastern Europe would make it

Ten billion mouths

hard for a post-Gorbachev fist-banger to restore control there, were he to try. And even inside the Soviet Union, some errant republics—particularly Moldavia and Azerbaijan, with ethnic ties across Soviet borders—might still choose to make a fight of it.

The Soviet Union is at a turning-point. Whichever way it lurches, years of pain and instability lie ahead.

The human race World population past and projected (UN medium vart

Slowly but profoundly, demography is changing the ways of the world

JUST as Maynard Keynes observed, the great events of history are often due to slow changes in demography, hardly noticed at the time. The second half of this century has seen an astonishing acceleration in the world's population growth—followed by an equally astonishing fall in fertility. The first makes it virtually certain that human numbers, now around 5.1 billion, will reach 8 billion by 2025, and double by the end of the next century. The second makes it possible no more—that this increase will then give way to stability.

What kind of world will this be? Blacker and browner, for sure (see pages 19-22). Today's developed countries, including Japan, the Soviet Union and all of Europe, are home to roughly a quarter of mankind; by 2025 they will have barely one person in six. By then the combined populations of North America, Europe, Oceania, Japan and the Soviet Union will be outnumbered by Africa's. And India will be overtaking China as the world's most populous nation. Some places will see their numbers as a strength. For countries fighting foot-slogging wars (eg, Iran v Iraq), babies are soldiers-inwaiting. But numbers will not guarantee military muscle. The baby-burgeoning countries will increasingly be the poorest, preoccupied with the struggle for food and jobs.

On paper, the world can feed double its present mouths; but only on paper. Some of the most heavily populated countries have least ability to grow more food. Cereal farmers may rejoice that there will be 3 billion more customers for their grains by 2025. But customers in Bangladesh, say, or Kenya are unlikely to be able to pay their bills. Within the third world, countries that are good at organising their finances and their industries tend to be good at contraception, too; they will get richer while the badly organised continue to get babies. In 50 years' time income gaps within today's third world may be as large as those that now exist between rich nations and poor. Countries like South Korea—poorer than Ghana at the end of the second world war—will have as little sympathy as *nouveaux riches* the world over feel for those too feckless to better themselves.

Old and rich or young and jobless

Fast population growth in poor countries may often be a powerful cause of unrest. Crimes in rich countries are mainly the work of teenaged boys. Lots of babies means, 15 years on, lots of underemployed youngsters, better educated than their parents but with less chance of a job or a plot of land. They will look longingly at the job vacancies in the rich world. For with only a handful of exceptions (the Soviet Union, Poland, Ireland) the number of children that rich-world women are likely to have is now too low to maintain the population. Italy has almost overtaken West Germany on the way down: indeed, around Milan, present births indicate that women will have an average of 1. I children in a lifetime. This fall in fertility will have lasting effects. Just as rapid population growth boosts the numbers of young mothers and guarantees lots of future babies, so it is hard, once a population starts to age, to reverse the trend.

Already, employers in rich countries are queueing at school gates for a shrinking supply of youngsters. If the workforces of the industrial countries no longer expand, all economic growth will have to come from higher productivity—either through technical ingenuity or investment. That will force employers to hunt as never before for ways to raise productivity in the labour-rich service industries. It will put a premium on education: no country will be able to afford to waste labour on unskilled unemployment. And it will improve the position of women. Even the Japanese will find that they cannot afford to waste half their person-power.

Equally important, though, will be the effects on world trade. Immigration would be an obvious way to fill vacancies in rich countries and put money in the pockets of the poor, but immigration will get tougher, not easier. Instead, companies that need lots of labour will face a choice: invent a way of doing without, or move to the third world. There, they will find a labour force made cheap and pliable by sheer numbers. The poor countries that do best will be those that welcome such investment; the companies that succeed will be those that learn to manage third-world workers. The prototype may be Hongkong, whose manufacturers employ more people in China than in the colony itself.

Quite early in the next century, countries now labelled "third-world" will themselves be aging fast. By 2020 the median age of Mexico's population will be 33.4 years (Europe's now is 33.9), and a third of the citizens of Singapore will be 55 or older. More dramatic still, China in 2025 will have as big a share of over-60s as Europe in 2010. Some poor countries will soon be aging faster than the West, but with little state welfare to replace lost traditions of families caring for the old. They have perhaps two generations to build up the national income to look after granny.



The industrial countries are already the oldest nations the world has ever known. They will get older yet. The flip side of the baby boom is the grey glut. On present trends a fifth of Americans, and a quarter of West Germans, will be 65 or over by the middle of the next century. A stable world population

Homework for Bush

While other countries are dominating the headlines, America can do itself good by sorting out its domestic troubles



EXACTLY one year into the Bush presidency, Americans feel the world's attention shifting away from them. Mikhail Gorbachev, not Ronald Reagan, is named man of the decade by Time magazine. The biggest foreign deployment of American troops since Vietnam is quickly overshadowed by revolution in Romania. Europe's future is avidly discussed by Europeans, east and west, with barely a nod in the direction of Washington. America watches, under a vision-free president elected to do (more kindly and gently) the same things as his predecessor.

No news may be good news, but that has not stopped Mr George Bush attracting some of the blame for America's new mistiness. For the first half of last year, his critics found the reason in Mr Bush's curious passivity towards foreign policy. Elected as the man "ready to be president on day one", he spent five months waiting for an obsolescent strategic review to tell him what he could expect from Mr Gorbachev. He learnt from that hiatus, so used the next six months to confound his critics. He grabbed the initiative with a plan for conventional-arms control in Europe; he welcomed perestroika; he sprang a summit on the world; he invaded Panama. In doing so, he disposed of the epithet "wimp" as firmly as he laid to rest the charge that he was fiddling while communism crumbled. His popularity rocked along-Mr Jim Baker's term-at more than 70% in the polls.

Yet still the feeling persists that America is a spectator at the ringside of world events. To some extent this is inevitable: most of the events are happening elsewhere. But Mr Bush can do something about it. If the 1980s taught anything, it is that even a superpower's influence abroad depends on its self-confidence at home. Hamstrung by its twin deficits, America can offer only derisory amounts of aid to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or even new democracies in its own hemisphere. Mr Bush will not be more influential abroad until he solves some problems at home, starting with those deficits. However tempting foreign policy now seems-and 1990 will probably have a full menu of summits and treaties-he would do well to take the opportunity of his first state of the union speech on January 31st to show the boldness on domestic issues that has paid off in foreign affairs.

The temptation to travel is certainly great. Mr Bush has been out of Washington for 132 days of the first 365 he has been in office. When not abroad or on energetic holidays, he hops about the country lending a hand to Republican candidates in forthcoming elections: this week he was in Florida to help the governor's effort to get re-elected. After campaigning

for president on and off for 15 years, it must be hard to stop. And since he has won fewer congressional roll-call votes than any previous postwar president in his first year save Gerald Ford, his increasing neglect of Congress is understandable.

implies, in time, such figures for every country from Afghani-

stan to Zimbabwe. The birth dearth, that preoccupation of

the West in the 1930s, will once again raise the question: are

such elderly societies preferable to yet more babies? Many

countries may come to doubt it.

Understandable, but foolish. Mr Bush began his presidency with plenty of bipartisan goodwill on Capitol Hill and promptly won that rare prize, an early deal to tackle the budget deficit. He lost much of that goodwill-and the dealpartly through the intransigence of both sides over cutting the capital-gains-tax rate and partly by frittering away his energy on things like a constitutional amendment to ban flagburning. This convinced many Democrats that he was not serious about reducing the budget deficit. They are now saying there will be no early budget deal in 1990. Mr Bush still regards the cut in capital-gains tax as a main domestic goal for 1990. Add to that a new congressional enthusiasm for reducing the regressive payroll tax (see page 24), and the budget deficit looks tougher than ever.


Congress can be unblocked

Cast in the role of consolidator of the Reagan revolution, Mr Bush has been cautious about new legislation. He proposes little and opposes much, giving ground only when under pressure, as he grudgingly did on the raising of the minimum wage. He has spent the first year of his administration cleaning up his predecessor's messes (in the savings and loans industry and the Housing Department), resisting social-welfare legislation proposed by Congress, avoiding intractable issues such as health altogether, exhorting people on drugs, crime and education, and occasionally proposing a new idea with a flourish, only to admit there is no money to back it up (education, a trip to Mars).

True, the Democrats control Congress. But for an example of how to handle Congress, Mr Bush need look no further than his own clean-air proposals, which promptly broke a decade-long stalemate between powerful congressional interests. A bill much like Mr Bush's is emerging, with bipartisan support, from the House of Representatives. Mr Bush has no need to be afraid of Congress. He can afford to put some of his considerable political capital (his approval rating passed 80% in the polls after Mr Noriega's capture) behind domestic initiatives. Education reform, a fresh approach to drugs and crime, a balanced budget: these are the things that would revive the world's interest in America, not a president who spends his time avoiding domestic entanglements.

\$7 mil . I can . "As

WORLD POPULATION



Squeezing in the next five billion

The population explosion is over, say bold demographers. Maybe, but the world's numbers will still double before they stop growing

IN THE second half of the 1960s a remarkable thing happened. After millennia of creeping upwards, and a quarter-century of hectic dash, the rate of growth of world population began to slow down. Since then, some developing countries have seen the speediest falls in fertility ever known.

Only since the second world war has population growth in the poor countries overtaken that in the rich. The 1960s saw their population growth peak at 2.4% a year. Even now, annual growth in the third world is running at 2%—double Europe's mid-century peak. In 37 countries (22 of them in Africa and ten more in the Arab Middle East) the population is still increasing by more than 3% a year.

Though the rate of growth is falling, the numbers being added each year-87m-are unprecedented and still rising: the annual increase will reach 90m a year in the late 1990s, before starting a long decline. Yet the crest of the wave is passing. The transition that took a century to achieve in the West has come about in a generation in some developing countries. Third-world fertility has dropped further and faster than anybody foresaw 20 years ago.

Except in Africa and much of the Middle East, birth rates are now declining in every country. The most dramatic and significant fall has been in China, whose birth rate

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 20 1990

has more than halved since 1965. Since China is home to one-third of the developing world's people, that decline alone accounts for much of the change in prospects.

What happens next?

Death matters as much to demographers as birth—indeed more. As public health improves, deaths decline, mainly because more babies live to grow up. So a country's population becomes more youthful. More young adults means more births. Only after a spurt in total numbers do parents begin to limit their families. Eventually, the birth rate may fall till population stabilises.

In the rich countries this transition took place slowly. Life expectancy crept up, as real wages, living conditions, public health and medical care improved. In poor countries antibiotics and immunisation have helped many more babies to survive; infant mortality is now as low as it was quite recently in rich countries, and life expectancy has risen accordingly. In the early 1950s life expectancy at birth was over 70 years in only five countries, all in northern Europe. Now the list includes Costa Rica, Chile and Singapore. Already life expectancy in Mexico is 66 years—as high as in France in 1950.

This fall in infant mortality means that, even if every mother decided tomorrow to have no more than two children, the world's numbers would continue to grow. In many developing countries, the number of young women now reaching child-bearing age is larger than ever before. So the number of babies will go on rising long after birth rates have started to fall. In Brazil, for example, the fertility rate—the number of babies the average woman will have in her life, given her society's contemporary pattern of childbearing—has dropped by 30% since 1965; yet the birth rate—yearly births per 1,000 people—has dropped by only 19%. The total of births each year has risen from 3m in the late 1950s to 3.7m now.

So population will go on rising. But the sooner the world's fertility falls to replacement rate (ie, just above 2) the lower the figure at which the numbers may eventually level off. At what figure, when? The United Nations offers a range of projections. The medium variant assumes that the world will reach replacement fertility by 2035. If so, its population will stabilise toward the end of the twenty-first century at 10.2 billiondouble today's numbers. A 20-year delay in reaching replacement fertility would mean an eventual population 2.8 billion higher; replacement fertility by 2015 would cut the final number by 2.2 billion. The difference between these two extremes—5 billion—is the world's present population.

There are some grounds for optimism: • The number of children women want is lower than ever, and the younger the women, the fewer they want. Many countries show signs of a large unmet demand for contraception. A survey of married-women found that 46% in Peru had not wanted their latest child; 37% in South Korea; 34% in Sri Lanka. Modern contraception is not essential to restricting family size (only 60% of married women in Japan use it, fewer than in Costa Rica), but it helps.

WORLD POPULATION

• Recent signs from Zimbabwe, Kenya and Botswana suggest that fertility may at last be starting to fall even in black Africa. Those three countries have increased contraceptive use dramatically. In Botswana, with its scattered population, few couples used contraception ten years ago. Today around 27% do so. In Kenya the figure is just over 20%, in Zimbabwe 40%. But these are small countries compared with Nigeria or Ethiopia, where contraception is rare.

• As people move into towns, they have smaller families. A recent survey of 22 developing countries found that in all of them urban fertility rates were lower than those in the countryside. Evidence from Asia and Latin America suggests that the bigger the city, the more likely women are to use contraception. One reason may be that services are easier to reach; another, that children cost more to raise in cities. As roughly half of the world's people will live in cities by the end of this century, that is good news.

Yet caution is in order. Past forecasts grossly underestimated population growth. In 1945 America's most eminent demographer thought that by the year 2000 the world would have 3 billion people. Since 1963 the UN demographers have repeatedly raised their projections. Their middle variant now predicts 8 billion people by 2020. Even this rests on conservative assumptions about mortality, which would, for instance, leave life expectancy in the less-developed world in 2020 no higher than in North America in 1950. In contrast, the assumptions about births are bold. Fertility in Europe and North America is assumed to stay below replacement level until 2020; in most poor countries to fall almost to that level; in Africa, where most women still want at least five children and have six or more, to betwo-thirds of the way down to replacement.

This may be too bold. Since 1975 the decline in fertility seems to have levelled off in some third-world countries. In India, the world's second most populous country, the fertility rate has got stuck at 4.8. At that rate India would overtake China by the middle of the next century. In Indonesia fertility has dropped by more than a quarter since 1962,

to 4.3; but it has stuck there, close to the average number of children—4.1—that Indonesian parents want. So the population is still rising by 2% a year.


What happens to world population will depend disproportionately on China. Fertility there, after falling fast from six children per family to two, seems recently to have stalled. Why? Part of the answer may be that Chinese parents, like most Asians, long for a son. Experience in other Asian countries, such as South Korea, suggests that this longing may ultimately prevent fertility rates from declining to replacement levels.

Babies: for and against

Demographers tell of an African leader who (supposedly) began a speech warning his countrymen against over-population, with the words: "My people, our birth rate is so high that our numbers will double in only 25 years and ..." Wild cheering drowned the rest. Most developing countries now share the view of the leader rather than his audience. But the old Malthusian arguments against population growth have become more cautious and sophisticated with time.

The predictions of the early 1970s that all those extra mouths could not be fed have so far proved pessimistic. The proportion of the world's population suffering from malnutrition has declined (although the absolute number has risen). One reason is that food output in the poor countries rose by 3.1% a year between 1961 and 1980, well ahead even of their soaring populations. China and India, the two most populous countries, became self-sufficient in grain.

Nor is population growth necessarily bad for economic growth, as many people argued in the 1970s. Other factors—unstable government, anti-market economics clearly matter more. A committee of America's National Academy of Sciences studying the economic effects of population growth in 1986 found little evidence of damaging links. Mr Julian Simon, an American economist, goes further and argues that population growth can foster development: "The ultimate resource is people—skilled, spirited and hopeful people." More people means





Poor Bombay

more new ideas, a bigger market, bigger production volumes, higher productivity, smaller transport distances.

Conversely, even the links between population growth and environmental damage are not clearcut. Fast-growing populations destroy more trees, but the stable ones of rich countries use more energy and produce more filth.

So why worry? One reason is that new births will not be evenly spread around the globe, but concentrated in countries which are already poor and ofren have difficulty feeding the mouths they already have. Above all, that means Africa, which will have three times as many people in 2025 as it does now. Its largest country, Nigeria, will have almost 370 people to the square kilometre—more than Holland today.

In theory, the world could almost certainly grow enough food to feed twice as many people as it now has. One study, quoted in the World Bank's 1984 World Development Report, reckoned that, if average farm yields rose from the present two tonnes of grain equivalent per hectare to five, the world could support about 11¹/₂ billion people. Each could enjoy "plant energy"—food, seed and animal feed—of 6,000 calories a day, the current global average (the typical North American uses about 15,000 calories, but most of that has gone long before he gets his mouth to it, in keeping his T-bone steak on the hoof).

A different approach, in a 1983 study by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, put together information on soil and climate. With basic fertilisers and pesticides, all cultivable land under food crops and the most productive crops grown on at least half the land, the study concluded that the world could in the year 2000 feed four times its projected population. Even with one-third of cultivable land under non-food crops, the world could feed 1½ times its projected

THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 20 1990

WORLD POPULATION

population in 2150. Both Africa and South America could feed roughly ten times more people than today, if—it's a giant if—they switched entirely from peasant agriculture to the best practice of North America.

Even so, individual countries might starve. Using peasant techniques, 65 countries would need imports to feed their people by 2000. They would include 30 of Africa's 51 countries. Many of these—in east Africa and the Sahel—lie close to the sparsely populated lands of the central belt, which holds most of Africa's underused cultivable land. But increasingly tough controls on immigration may stop people moving to where the food is; and the poorest countries will not have the money to import it.

Rapid population growth may not prevent fast economic growth. But growth might be faster still without it, and would certainly be more equitable. Countries with high birth rates need to divert rising sums to education simply to stand still. They will need to raise investment rapidly, if income per worker is not to decline. A relatively large part of their workforce will be young, inexperienced and unskilled. That will hold back wages. Unemployment-or at least under-employment-will be endemic. Where most people work on the land (in poor countries the average is over two-thirds), many of the extra ones will have to find jobs in farming. Because the poor tend to have the biggest families, and the poorest countries (except China) tend to have the highest fertility, population growth will widen the gap between rich and poor both within and between countries.

Fast population growth does not always hurt the environment, but it makes harm more likely. People need fuel, and in many third-world countries wood is the main option. Already, the world is burning three times as much wood for fuel as it is growing. Cutting down trees causes soil erosion, which damages cropland, silts up dams and makes rivers less predictable.

Bulging cities bring other problems: Africa by 2025 will have 36 cities of 4m or more inhabitants and an average of 9m, more than greater London today. Yet as recently as 1950 no African city between Johannesburg and Cairo had even 1m inhabitants. Already, third-world cities face intractable problems of pollution and waste disposal, often linked. Fewer than a third of Indonesia's town-dwellers have safe ways to dispose of human waste, which therefore pollutes the water supply. The same story could be told from Lagos to Delhi, even though many third-world cities now spend a third or more of their budgets on collecting and disposing of refuse.

But the strongest arguments for slower population growth are not collective but individual. Fewer children means healthier and happier children. Short gaps between births do not just mean more babies; they mean weaker mothers and higher infant mortality, more hunger and greater poverty. With a gap of less than two years between births, infant mortality is more than twice as high as when babies come four years apart. China grasped quickly the links between fertility and mortality: it added 27 years to life expectancy in the space of 30 years. Increasingly, family planning will be seen as a way to lessen not just births but child deaths.

How to slow down

So how is population to be slowed? Broadly, as people get richer and—women especially—more educated, they want (and have) fewer children. But things are not quite that simple.

Under a fierce government, China, still one of the poorest countries, has cut fertility faster than any other. Brazil and Venezuela, well-off and rapidly industrialising, cut birth rates in 1965-75 by less than Sri Lanka or Thailand. Countries where income is equitably shared tend to have lower fertility than those where the gains of growth go to a lucky few.

Nor are the links between education and fertility straight-line. In general, well educated women do indeed have fewer children—four fewer in Colombia, for example—than the least educated. In poor counItaly have its lowest.

Much depends on governments. Except for oddballs like Iraq, Kuwait and Singapore, which are trying to raise fertility, in the past 20 years most poor countries have begun to see the case against rapid population growth. The most dramatic change has been in Africa: the UN's population division found that in 1976 only one-third of Africa's governments thought fertility was too high, by last year two-thirds. But practice takes time to catch up with perception: in 1976 a quarter of them had policies for restricting fertility, in 1989 still only half.

Not that government promotion of family-planning services, or even their existence, is essential: countries whose governments are lukewarm or hostile to birth control, such as Colombia and Brazil, have still seen steep falls in fertility, and nineteenth-century France had a birth rate half that of Kenya today. But governments can certainly help.

The rich world too can help—if it chooses. In the 1980s, after a long period of rapid growth, foreign aid to family-planning programmes dropped sharply, thanks notably to the American right and President Reagan. Of course, foreign aid is not necessary: China has paid all the costs of its birthcontrol programme—around \$1 a head—it-



A way to cut child deaths

tries, though, women who have never been to school at all breastfeed for longer, and so have fewer babies, than those who have spent a few years at primary school.

At any given level of wealth or education, culture influences family size: Muslim societies, for instance, like those of Bangladesh and the Middle East, tend to large families, perhaps because of the inferior status they accord to women. But the link is intricate. The Catholic church condemns birth control, and Catholic Ireland duly has Europe's highest fertility; but parts of Catholic self, and India four-fifths of its. But in most of the third world foreign aid has met roughly half the cost of family-planning policies, and the newer the policy, the higher the foreign share.

And rightly. Population programmes are a highly cost-effective way to raise living standards. More than 20 years ago President Lyndon Johnson argued -that \$5 spent on family planning was as effective a way of promoting development as \$100 invested in increasing production. That ratio still holds.

EC 43 THIRD WORLD CHURCHES Mr. Moffett Fall 1986

<u>Course description</u>. This survey of trends, problems and opportunities in the churches of the "third world", will focus on Africa, Latin America and Oceania, with briefer attention to Asia which is more adequately covered in EC41. It will highlight a number of specific churches and nations, and will touch on such third world issues as the rise of the younger churches and the demise of colonialism, unreached areas, and third world missions. If time permits it will briefly introduce readings in third world theology.

Textbook. No textbook will be required, but frequent reference may be made to the following books on reserve in Speer library:

D. Barrett, W. Buhlmann,	World Christian Encyclopedia
E. Dayton,	Ine Coming of the Third Church
L. Daylon,	Ine Future of World Evangelization. Unreached
с с в .	
C. G. Baeta,	Christianity in Tropical Africa Oxford Univ.
	Press 1968
E. Nida,	Understanding Latin America
F. Cooley,	The Growing Seed
C. Forman,	The Island Churches of the
	The Island Churches of the South Pacific

Requirements.

- 1200 pages of reading from the list of recommended books (on the attached list).
- 2. Two book reports on books from the recommended list, or of your own choosing, in which case permission must be given by the professor. Each book report will contain a one-page outline or summary and an additional half page of your own personal reaction to the book, whether positive or negative. The first book report is due on November 3; the second on

3. A mid-term text, tentatively scheduled for November 23.

4. A 10 page term paper will be required on one of the suggested topics (list attached separately), OR on a subject of your own choosing (which must be approved by the professor). The term paper is due on the date set for the final exam.

Term papers and book reports may be turned in to the faculty secretary in Room 104 at 21 Dickinson Street. Any requests for time extensions or absences must be made to the office of Professional Studies in Room 118, Hodge Hall. Reading List

Third. World Churches General

* David Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia (Oxford, 1982)

G. Anderson and T. Stransky, Mission Trends No. 5: Faith Meets Faith. (Grand

* Walbert Buhlmann, The Coming of the Third Church (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1976) Steven G. Mackie, ed., Can Churches Be Compared?

Donald McGavran, The Bridges of God (N.Y., 1955) (Geneva: WCC, 1969)

M. L. Hodges, On the Mission Field: The Indigenous Church (Chicago, 1953) IDOC (Joel Underwood, ed.) In Search of Mission: The Future of the Missionary

Larry Keyes, The Last Age of Missions (Pasadena, 1983)

Hendrik Kraemer, From Missionfield to Independent Church (The Hague, 1958) Louis J. Luzbetak, The Church and Cultures (Techny, Il., 1970)

Vinay Samuel and C. Sugden, Sharing Jesus in the Two Thirds World (Grand Henry P. Van Dusen, They Found the Church There (N.Y.: 1945)

Ralph D. Winter, The Twenty-Five Unbelievable Years (Pasadena, 1970) John C. B. Webster and Ellen L. Webster, The Church and Women in the Third

Sam Wilson and G. Aeschliman, The Hidden Half: Discovering the World of Unreached Peoples. (Monrovia, CA: MARC, 1984)

Africa

H. W. Turner, History of an African Independent Church (Oxford, 1967)

D. A. McGavran and Norman Riddle, Zaire: Midday in Mission (Valley Forge, 1979) John Taylor, Processes of Growth in an African Church (London, 1958). Pamphlet.

Pius Wakatama, Independence for the Third World's Church: An African's Perspective (Downers Grove, IL, 1976)

Stanley Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo (Richmond, 1970)

M.-F. Perrin-Jassy, Basic Community in the African Churches (Maryknoll, 1973) Bengt Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London, 1961)

Bengt Sundkler, The Christian Ministry in Africa (London, 1960)

G. Bond et al. (eds.), African Christianity

Marie-Louise Martin, Kimbangu: An African Prophet and His Church (Oxford, 1975) F. B. Welbourn, East African Rebels: A Study of Some Independent Churches

Robert T. Parsons, Windows on Africa (Leiden, 1971)

W.J. Hollenweger, Marxist and Kimbanguist Mission: A Comparison (Birmingham,

J. B. Grimley and G. E. Robinson, Church Growth in Central and Southern Nigeria D. J. Bosch, Church and Culture Change in Africa (Pretoria, 1971)

C. G. Baeta, Prophetism in Ghana (London, 1962)

* C. G. Baeta, Christianity in Tropical Africa (London, 1968) D. A. Barrett, Schism and Renewal in Africa (Oxford, 1968)

M. L. Daneel, The Background and Rise of the Southern Shona Independent Churches R. F. Coster, The Sierra Leone Church, A Contemporary Study (London, 1961)

G. M. Haliburton, The Prophet Harris and His Work in Ivory Coast and Western

page 2

EC 43 Reading List - Africa continued

F. B. Welbourn and S. A. Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home: A Study of Two Independent Churches in Western Kenya (London, 1966)

Sheila S. Walker, The Religious Revolution in the Ivory Coast, The Prophet Harris...(, 1983)

Lamin Sanneh, West African Christianity: The Religions Impact. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1983)

John Weller and Jane Linden, Mainstream Christianity to 1980 in Malausi, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Gwerv, Zimbabwe, 1984)

Latin America

General:

Edward Clear, Crisis in Latin America

World Christianity: Central America and the Caribbean, C.L. Holland, ed., Monrovia: MARC, 1981

Puebla and Beyond, ed. J. Eagleson and P. Scharper. Maryknoll: Orbis, 1980 Orlando Costas, The Church and Mission: A Shattering Critique from the Third

World. Wheaton IL: Tyndale, 1974

Mortimer and Esther Arias, The Cry of My People (New York, 1980)

Guillermo Cook, The Expectation of the Poor (Maryknoll, N.Y. 1985)

John A. Mackay, That Other America. N.Y.: Friendship Press, 1935

John A. Mackay, The Other Spanish Christ. N.Y.: Friendship Press

W. Stanley Rycroft, Religion and Faith in Latin America. Phila: Westminster

W. Dayton Roberts, Revolution in Evangelism. Chicago: Moody, 1967

C. Peter Wagner, Look Out! The Pentecostals are Coming. Carol Stream IL: Creation, 1973

W. M. Nelson, Protestantism in Central America. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984 David Martin, Tongues & Fire. Stoll, 55 Latin Americe Becoming Partestant

- T. C. Bruneau, The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church. London: Cambridge, 1974
- D. E. Mutchler, Roman Catholicism in Brazil: A Study in Church Behaviour Under Stress. St. Louis: 1965
- W. R. Read and F. A. Ineson, Brazil 1980: The Protestant Handbook. Monrovia CA: MARC, 1973
- W. R. Read et al, New Patterns of Church Growth in Brazil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

C. Peter Wagner, The Protestant Movement in Bolivia. S. Pasadena: Wm. Carey, 1970 Q. Nordyke, Animistic Aymaras and Church Growth. Newberg OR: Barclay, 1970

Justo I. Gonsalez, The Development of Christianity in the Latin Caribbean. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969

Christian Lalive d'Epinay, Haven of the Masses: A Study of the Pentecostal Movement in Chile. London: Lutterworth, 1969

J.B.A. Kessler, A Study of the Older Protestant Mission Churches in Peru and Chile. Goes, Netherlands: Oosterban and Le Cointre, 1967

E. Williams, Followers of the New Faith: Culture and Change and the Rise of Protestantism in Brazil and Chile. Nashville TN: Vanderbilt, 1967

EC 43 Reading List - Latin America continued

- R. Brunzel, Chichicastenango: A Guatemalan Village (Christo-paganism). Seattle: U. of Washington, 1952
- G. M. Emery, Protestantism in Guatemala: its Influence on the Bicultural Situation...Cuernavaca, Mex.: CIDOC, 1970
- C. Bennett, Tinder in Tabasco: A Study of Church Growth in Tropical Mexico. Gr. Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1968
- W. Madsen, Christo-Paganism...New Orleans: Tuland Univ., 1957 (Publ. #19)
- D. A. McGavran and J. Huegel etc., Church Growth in Mexico. Gr. Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963

Peru:

- J. L. Klaiber, Religion and Revolution in Peru, 1824-1976. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979
- K. E. Hamilton, Church Growth in the High Andes. Lucknow, India: Lucknow Publ. House

South Asia and Oceania

 * Frank L. Cooley, The Growing Seed (NY: NCC, 198) George W. Peters, Indonesia Revival (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1973) Paul B. Pedersen, Batak Blood and Protestant Soul (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1970) Ebbie C. Smith, God's Miracles: Indonesian Church Growth (Pasadena: Wm. Carey, 1970)

Jonathan Lindell, Nepal and the Gospel of God (India: Thompson Press, 1979)

Frederick S. Downs, Christianity in North East India: Historical Perspective (Delhi: ISPCK, 1983)

- Donald A. McGavran, Ethnic Realities and the Church [India] (Pasadena: W. Carey, 1979)
- Stephen Neill, The Story of the Church in India and Pakistan (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970)

Georges Delbos, The Mustard Seed [Papua] (Port Moresby: Institute of Papua, New Guinea Studies, 1985)

* Charles Forman, The Island Churches of the South Pacific (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1982) Darrell Whiteman, Melanesians and Missionaries (Pasadena: Wm. Carey, 1983)

1							(5.)	
1								
The_chast_Co	b. 3 gette 1	Huned K S). < 7	T +1 11-			•	
The chart, (mp. 3 gothe Wold Kn Enc.) is Smething the this.								
	AD 30	500	1500	1800	1900	+ 1980	[0	
White	5.0%	38.1	92.6	86,5			2,000 40	
Black		-	0.3	3.0	- 81.1 55 - 4.5 150		39.8	
Brown_		1.4	1.5	3,0	5.1 10-8	10,8	22.9	
	95.0	59.5	4.8	2.2	5.0 1006	10.6	<u>13.0</u>	
Red			0.7	2.3	2.5	6.8		
				3.0	67 1.7	3= 3.1		
-frey	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				0.1	0.2		
					April			
St	nlized skin_co.	loms			w dennes			
# 5	Black - Aprica	m. herroid		(wild be	201	- 1		
							p. 818 parine).	
# 4 14 7	and the second sec		lan mar 111. In	hada .		1		
	and the second sec		Uralian_ethingle	isustically. ((wild the 918	190 700)		
*		- mangic		, ,	(,550	480 ETD)		
	Red - Amin					6,740,300)		
	- grey - austr	int S. Ap hu	shmen		(11 34			
						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
The cl	at din #							
	nent shows t	hal the	entest dectin	ip_c/hm_in	- unld C	hustionity		
is white (from	81 20 m 1	900 \$ 5.	9. 1. 160					
		L00	- 10 14 1780	to an estim	sted_ 40% 1	i 2m AD);	
The fastist nony	c.Im is be	uck Chr	42 9 1	160 t	ica L -			
in-rate of grift		IM	n i m		10% 5 2	-3°lu n 2000);	
the third, thick s	maller in mon	-her + ferce	entre is yell	w (hm	2 1 0 : 190	- + -n	•	
		1				<u>vj & /20 h</u>	<u>h</u>	
	the third, that smaller in numbers + fercentere is yellow (from 2290 in 1900; to 790 in 1950 at 82 90 in 2,000); While close firsth is brown (from 570. 1900, to 1190 at 1190 and							
12:1 0.)						-1 -11:00	100 -	
13% in 2,000).								
2	1. 11-4	• /	-g-pugle (m	t Kis?				
Nem	in the	m_sheep_h	umber the	largest colon	n av yelln	W (12 billion	·)	
Remember that in sheer number, the largest colons are yellow (12 billion) and brown (1 billion), and white (also intermenty 1 billion. Black and (Aprice).								
	month - 1	ant and	_ White_ (also	- inter hearth	1-1 milini	Black any	(CAprici)	
ent tom. (Midtle Ser	F) ind In	1+ -	1.1/-					
	, the we	ame 2	- a Rithm	ente-				

.

Think for a moment about what this means for the und chinstian mission in an time. Here are some brief throphts. (spinitually materially 1. The old power base of Christian missions is eroding. Christianity from the tome y the Reprometion (1000) to the 2013 c. (1900) was exactly What the third - would sometimes still calls it - " " white man's religion ". 2. But it isn't any longer. As of this year it is chow is danher than white 4. This probably means a slift in the base of mission from the west to the third-unld if Christianis are going to carry int the Biblical mandate of reaching the whole wild with and clean, effective presentation of the and claims of Jens Christ. 3. The pomer base of missions will probably shift to the fating peoples who are turning faster to find Jesus Christ as Ind I Samin them other - to black, yellows and brown races of this would. Therefore, in any planning for the patient of the Chustian chich d its would mission, it is absolutely imperative

EC 43 - whodedon

that we the third-wild churches into become an indispenseble part of our the planning and operation. Western planning for wold mission, y it is done in violation from the churches of the third und is obsolete. Nothing but corporative would planning to would Christian mission in 1 do in today's unld. We live in a hen pituation -But colom, as we know, is a very imperfect, highly stylized II. enterior produciding the could's population into categories - thigh it is still one of the most prevalent. Another but usdely used category is political the dinde up the unld's population by countries. Here too we find a starting change: - In Caregie day If ine measure the spreed g Christianity politically by blocs 7 communes as y 1980

- When In Enc. - p. y. Table 2

The Encyclo fedra (p.3), 1 reporting on this dots ibution f

the wold by commer poes on the Sing that,

U

(8) "In _73 g the mills 223 committees, Clumitians und for the majority (one 502); in one - third hap the uned's communities they are still a min orty. This spread is very uneven through See Slobel Nep 17. Christianis number under men 90% in 100 compris; less than 10% in 51 compris; less than 120 in 24 compriss, and less than to g 120 in 6_ countries: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Somalia, North_ Yemen and Smith Yemen. (p. 3). I note that Nepel is classified as to y 120 Christian, but the pymes are as I a few years go. Today thank to the low-key but ame zigly effective witness of the United Minim to Nepal in just the last three on from years, I think that Nepul, though still in the class of repuis where public everychion is about they phildien, has become at least more than 1% (not to 9 1%) Christian 2/5/85

Inth

B. Introduction to the Third World Churches.

But it is the 3rd unld chunches which is the primary subject of two courses. So before we turn to continental surveys of Mprican, lating American and Asian Christianity, let me make some preliminary observations about the situation of the churches in the third would. 9.

First, hand does the chunch-compare the Churitian chunch is extremely unevenly distributed in the third uned. Its (uniting total Xm adhunts precentage of the population, on the fire three third-uned continints ranges from

P3.5% in is latin America (348,659,000 g 2111,640,000)
 94.2.020 in Aprice (203,441,000 g 460,657,000)
 9.44.2.020 in Aprice (203,441,000 g 460,657,000)
 5.190 in Asia. (125,075,000 g 2,514,550,000)
 10.5.190 in Oceanie (20,299,000 g 23,452,000)
 10.21 86,420 in Oceanie (20,299,000 g 23,452,000)
 11.23,052,000 g 23,452,000
 12.3,452,000 g 23,452,000
 12.3,452,000 g 23,452,000
 13.456 and latin America the Situation - Would Sin Su, p 78:45.
 13.456 about 95%
 14.456 about 95%

By way of Companyin, ferhaps I shall add 1st + 2nd under fryones. -(2) 85.3% n With Amèrica (219, 833,000 + 245, 837,000) (3) 85.4% 70 n Surfe (415, 601,000 + 486, 436,000) (3) 85.4% 70 n Surfe (415, 601,000 + 486, 436,000) (3) 85.4% 70 n Surfe (415, 601,000 + 486, 436,000) (4) 72- 00 + 265 (15,000)

EC 43

If we exclude largely Christian (technically Christian) lecture America, and examine Asia and Africa a lettle more closely as to the religions situation on three two continents, it is better perhaps to divide them into three sections: Aprile, South Asia and East Asia.

Africa is almost evenly divided between Chustions and Muslims, with Chustianis recently having a slipht edge. Bejore 1970 Muslims had been in the majority. But in 1980 the statistics were Chustoms 203 million (203,490,000) - 44,29, 4 Minie's population Muslims 190 million (189,728,00) - 44,29, 4 Minie's population Muslims 190 million (189,728,00) - 41,290 " Tribel religions by million (63,872,00) - 13,990 " (Wirdd In. Suc., J. 782)

Moving east it acros the Red See . Indian ocean with Asia, beginning with South Asia (which includes the Asian Huddle Sost), the Largest religious proping is Hundin, with Muslims second. In 1980 -

> Hundus 515 million (515, 368, 000) - 41.2 % Muslims 405 million (405, 286, 000) - 32.4 % Pruddhisti 135 ". (134, 508,000) - 9,4 % Christians 109 " (109, 051, 000) - 7.6 %

East Asia, aparin, is very different. In 1950, by for, the largest propries called itself "non-religions". Non-religions SSG multini (549,340,000) - 50.5% Churchie folkered. 190 " (189,670,000) - 15.3% Buddhists 136 " (137,557,070) - 12.7% Athent "E" (112,653,070) - 12.7%

New Religionist. Auslinis	34 millioni (37, 291, 00) 3,2 %
	22 million (21, 491,000) 2.0 %
Shamonasts-	13 million (13,055,000) -1.2-2
Christianis	19 million (19.026,000) 1.8 %
Showwants	13 " (13,058,000) 1.290

Confinction Shinto

0.5 0.3

- pt. 30, 1986-

0							L	
Populetins 198	o. Africa	461	million					
1	S. Asia	1,427	million)					
	LE. ABIL	1,087	million 1					
	Asia	2,514	million					
	Empe	486	millin					
	L. America	372	mittim					
	USSR	268	million					
	N. America		million					
	O Ceamin	24	million .	· (p. 782)	(18,4 m. i	Busty/NZ;	5 m. in the is	lands)

~

Ĥ,

. <

EC V3 Wird Kn Enc.

£

ilde largest Protestant Churches (Brurett, 1982)		A.	4	v
1 Children 2 Adrits	Albert	1951	1968	
1. CHURCH OF CHRIST ZAIRE (D 1, 519, 499 2. ASSEMBLIES DE GED RECORD	4,728,280			
DKALL () 2 HOZ	4,000,000	15	2	
HVICH (HVICH (HCHAY) U 1 S60 000	3 500 000		1	
4. KIMBANGUIST CHURCH, ZAIRE 2,000,000	3,500,000			-
5. ANGLICAN CHURCH NIGERIA 359,969 6. PROTESTANT (REF.) CHURCH, INDONESIA (5) 987,000	2041 000	10	6	
T KULERO CHURCH, INDONESIA (D) 987,000	2, 142,000		Tn1	
7. NIGERIA FELLOWSHIP & CHURCHES Of CHRIST (SUM) 100, 553	1,746,000			······································
8. CHURCH Of SOUTH INDIA (9) 515, 700	1,555,902	-	y	
9. CHURCH OF CHRIST MANALISTA (PHILIPPINES) (12 400,000	1,500,000			
10. ANELICAN CHURCH, VEANDA 306,355	1,383,951	1 12	19	Ka
12. AVELICAN CHURCH IN KOREA, HAPDONG 200,000 12. AVELICAN CHURCH, SOUTH AFRICA 13. DUTCH PCC. SOUTH AFRICA	1298295		16	
JUTCH DEPORMED CHUICH JOUTH AFRICA (WHITE) 3749 876	1,235,946			-
TS. BAPTIST CONVENTION OF PHURCHES in N.E. INDIA 230 200	1.064 890	£* 1	10	
UNITAR CHRISTIAN IRGIESTANT CHURCH INPONESIAND YES YES	1,050,000		12	
11. VENTECOSTAL CHURCHES & INDONESIA D 750 000	1,000,000		<u> </u>	-
IN CONFREGATIONS CRISTA BRAZIL & CHRIST (8) LOD OTO	1,000,000		0	-
19. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF GOREA TONGHOP 253 Low	1 on o			- (
20. EVANGELICAL PENTECOSTALS, BRAZIL FOR CHRIST 250 000	1.000,000		_(
21. DOUTH AFRICAN METHODIST CHURCH 373 635	942,545			
23. METHOPIST CHURCH IN SOUTH ASIA (ID 42/ 109	901 306	-1 :		-
23. MADAGASCAR CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 250 000	881,487	1	14	-
24 BURMA BAPTIST CONVENTION 24E 966	· · · ·	0		-
25. UNITED EV. LUTHERAN CHS IN INDIA 339 690	798,560			-
26. CHURCH J CENTRAL AFRICA, PRESBYTERIAN (MALAWI) 252,171	766,000		7.	-
Fresh 5	,			-

Participation 5 Participation 4 Angina 4 B.: 1 3 United 3

Indep 1. 3 Lethor 2 Nothell 2

-

>___

LATIN AMERICA

Sv. - 1 - m ilsour

ter .

1 A.

Today I want to introduce, the third unld churches of the Western Hennisphere - that part if the western hennisphere which lies sonth of the United States of America. We call it hatin America - but the term is a little hand to justify. I don't would to waste time on language of what we call This area. John America, for example? As Dr. Mackay used to point ant When I was a student here - It should be called "Columbia" - all this part g the world. Columbus was the discoveres; Americas Vespacci was only a secondrate explorer, but much better at publicity than Columbus - so we are in America not Columbie. In adentally, what Columbus discovered, uses not North america, but latin America - first the Bahamas (NE of Cuba), then Cuba (where he expected the find the descendants of Genzhiz Khan), then South Dominican Rep.). It was on his 3rd mappe (1498) that he discovered the mainland, in what is now Vonequele. So if anyone has printy in choosing a non-modern name for the them selves it is not we up here, who call on selves that Americans, but and really North Americans but the peple of the south - who call themselves Americanos - who think if us ac quite projety Noteamericanos, a Vanguis, a pot grupas. They have first rights to The tigle of takin Americana are Americana, says tree ? However, The atigns of the same monophyses the term, but it should be remainded that takin Americans are not spanning, they are Americano . (We American Michie South, 10.7) The name Americans - But they are first rights to the land. In takin America, I in North America the land first belinged to the people we bitts now call Indrains.

 \bigcirc

EC 13

3.

And it is well to be reminded of that fail in any discussion of the prevailing contemporary Theological immement in latin America - "Liberation Rellagy". It is the Indrains, not the later Americans who have first rights to the call for liberation from oppression.

To review the history. The Indians were discovered and colonized from 1492 to 1806. The colonial ferroid. (1492-1806). Since the colonizers were Spaniards, Portuguese or them to a nuch losser degree French (all speaking latin-derived languages) - the regim became known as latin America. But the latins, in latin America, were the colonialits, Transformed from colonialists into naturalists by a revolution (just us the Under Americans of the U.S.A. are colonialist, transformed with naturalists by a revolution).

Dre second ferried, then is the resultion (1806-1825). The so lating beging in argunture in 1806 American revolution, came some 30 years later than the North American revolution of 1776and lastert about 20 years. The geo. Washington of the South was Somin Boliveri. But while the northern revolution, the southern are here united the former colonies into a United States. Bolivin dreamed of a united republicin government for all the south. It never heppend. Chuck interests and your close dominance of an elite minority (the year class) made democracy impossible. The population was 1996 while, 3196 mostizo, 4586 Indiai, 496 blad than and required greeds formed more formed in the ideal of contrast units.

Let. Am.

(Z)

(3) So the third ferrind (1825 -), is the mise of the latin nations. Dipmally about 9010 white Threating, Parpay, Brazil (which chilist become a republic with 1854) Bolinsk, Paragnay, Pern, Colombia (to the Panone Came), Encane, Mexico - and the United Provinces of Cartral America. Venezuela secedal from Colomba in 1830. But there are the major reprins: Spenish Smith America, Portuguese Smith anima, Central America (mevenly divided between laye Mexico, A the smaller republics) - ed the Cambbean. But it is also durided by languages with y groups: -1. Sparuch - from Mexico to apentine. 2. Intuprese - the largest contry of all Brigil, doem't speet Sprinth. 3. French - Haiti 4. English - pochets of Suphits language nations, united in Carricon". 12 members: Antyria + Benbuda, Benbados, Belize, Dominice, Grenade, Gryone, Jamaica, Montsenat, St. Lucia, St. Kette-Nens, St. Vincant and Grenadores, @ Frinded . Blags - inthe Belewas as observer. 5,400,000 people (Jamaica 2,200,000; Tr.+Tob. 1,000,00; Conyana 900,000). Altogether, latin Americe usually refers to the 20 countries south & Cube plus some of the und independent smaller island of the Can Mean. In pize - this is a land area mpthy speel to Empe and the

United States combined: 25 percent monitorium; 25% swampy land; and 10% desert, or very day.

The people are a broad mixture - The my niel in habitants, called Indraine because Columbus that he had fond India) number about 45 million. They are about 9170 km. -Theirs is the lowest percentage of Christianis - about 90% - but have the highest proentige of the unreached, wougelistically. It is the Indian population that has suffered the most sharpest decline in @ propulation, as a result of the Latin conquest - from 45% of the population in 1800 to 1520 today. 3 The white, a Spanish/Portuguese (I in argentine, British) colonafists munder æbent 131 million - a 45% g the 300 m. total (as g snog 10 years ges - cx. 1973) A This has been the fastest growing segment - from 1920 in 1800 to 45% today. Interesta 3 The meetize segment (a blend of white and Indian) humbers about 118 million, n 40% g the population - and are about 92.5% Churtian. But the difference in percentage of Christians in the three ethnic symptimes is noheible - from 922 2 among mestizos (the hypest) to 90% among the white the lowest - a spreed of only 2220. The latest price - an extrapolation of growth rates to 1980 - quies the percentage of Christianis in Latin America slightly higher - 93.8 %. And it pritter high-lights the greatest physical danger browing on the later American scene - not mideer explosion but a population explosion - a population frenie expanding even faster thom Asia's - thigh numerically much smaller. In 1900 Latin

Ð.

L. América had: 1900 - 65 million Commonder of 21 m. every 10 mps) 1970 - 283 million Commonder of 21 m. every 10 mps) 1980 - 377 million (an marine of 89 m. in bast 10 mps.) 2000. - 620 million. (an av. morense of 124 m. ivery 10 mps.).

hom 65 million to 620 million in one century is an unmanageable explosion. I doubt if letim Americe's basic social and economic problem is either political oppression on prego economic in perielsion. Both are benins problems - but I suspect it is population pressure that ignites the fires that keep them explosive.

Evenpeliotically, I find it hard to quantify the challage g latin America. Ne Would Christian Encyclopeachia, list the continent as and the continent in 1989, and 92% Christian 1989 which indicates that the ratio of unimed loss to population has almost kept area with the population explosion. Again the meanswered question is -"How many of the unimed Christianis are as effectively invesced as the statistically invesched.

But more on that later. Let me now turn to the third-und chuches in latin America.

First, two prelimining observations.

1. First, latin America, as a continent is impre in the third inded in that it is the only one of the three (Aprice, Asie, Lit. An) that is mensively (9490) Christian. In compression, Aprice is only held Christian (442) and Asia barely touched (490 =>). Only Oceanie comes anywhere near latin America in percentage of Kns, '4 we consider it separately from Asia. In the West - Russia is less Christian than Aprice (3690); Europe less Christian Oceanie - & - 852 90; and North Americe less Christian' than latim America - 88.3 90.

2. Laten America is massively Roman Catholic. It is virtually improvible to draw meaninful compansions between the Roman Catholic church in that somthern continent, and the small groups of Protestants. How can you compare a block of \$28 million Christians in one at Catholic church, to a comparative handful of 17 million-plus, Protestant, (called "evarpelicals" in L. A.) durided among 3,503 different deuxemisteris?

3. The fastest growing, most divided, but still most sympicant sequent of latin American Protestantism is the Pentecostal. In country ofter country, the largest churches of demonstrational are not Presbytenian, Spiscipal. Nethodist, Interan a even Beptert, but Pentecostal.

The largest denominations in latin	America		
	Mphated	Bult	
1. Assemblies of God, Brazil	4,000,000	2,783,000	
2. Apostolin Church of mazil (ex RC)	2,000,000	1,000,000	(ox R.C.)
3. Brezil Baptist Convention	1,050,000	350, 29Y	(Smithen Bapt.)
4. Pentecostal Ch. g Brazil for Christ	1,000,000	250,000	(sy Anglord)
5. Christian Congregations of Brazil 6. Evangehical Intherans of Brazil	1,000,000	60,000	(midy. Pent., Italian origin)
6. Evangehial Intherans of Brazil	629,000	136,000	(bressman luth.)
7. There Ch. g Brizel	623,000	124,900	(VPCUSA. Peus)
8. Methodist Pentecostals Chile	are tak	150,000	(split from Meth, 1909 - 20 schwing sing
9. Evenpelical Pentecostal Chile . 10 Union of Evenpelical Indel Churches, Mexico	400,000	200,000	
10 Ohnin of Everypelical Inder Churches, Mexico	350,000	/50 m	(split for M. Pat 5 for musing (Pente costal, Otomin Tuds.)
North Lift R. M.			

7 not 2 fint ten are in Brazil. 6 not y fint ten are Pentental.

~

tı.	Mormons Dagico	
θ,	Seventh Day Adventists, Prezil	300,000
12、13月	National Crusede by Evangelization Evangelied Lith. Ch. of merre Indep. Inest. Ch. of Marie	200 000 (ICFG in Evenchul Ch. 4 In therew Confermin) 180,000 (4446 schum from Presb. a. Pros.) 166 535 (B t a f China)
うないたい	Uning of Wayehial Baptists Morning Mexico	169, 835 (Bapt. general Cry. USA) 112,000
16.	Amembles of bord, Mexico	100,000
17.	Amendues & God, Chile	100,000 (sylit from Everyel. Pentec.)
18 .	Wanpehiel Meth. Pentecostal Remated	100,000 (split prov. Meth. Tent.)
19.	Postecotal Ch. J Chile	100,000 (split from Meth. Peut. 1961. Wac)
20	Jehnnahie Witnesses, Murico	100,000

barcentage of	population	Intestant		
Chile -	22.5%	2 3 m.		
		; 2 m.		
Brazil	17.4 %	= 24 m. (18 m best and Brizelini R	have finied everychical or other groups.
			- WCE 1950	Fined evaluation of other props.
			op would 1987	

-

E D. Peterstals

When the thin president of the seminary, Dr. John Meckay, returned from a trop to later America in 1950, - I remember him reporting to shocked andreas here on the campus, and in demonistical od ecomenical based headquarters in New York:

"The future of the Grappl in later America is in the hands of the Roman Cellulis of the Periterstals." The Entry let Anguie a the heart R. Children? That was almost herein back in 1950 - third man line confidently the providence of the international and according the world was a challenging a Roman Cetholic inscendancy in glass the world which it would have a communical base in Geneva, A its far-flung, still-graving missionaing empire according the world globe. And who sheld know better than Jam Meckey - who had consistently told as that Cathelician was a greater threat to South America than communication. Yet here he was, a bandoning ship as it were - after all his years as a missioning in Peru - and tury are back the continuit to his old reectioning foes - the Cethultic Club in S. America.

And to the Pentecostals, that was pist as bad. In the 1950s -Tentecostals were Holy Rollers, the limatic frage, stray on emiting but Sadly lacking in the Moojon Incomment and intellect.

How could the Prendent of Priceton be so naive. Prethodiste, Prendentioning

Beptinte were The Rman Cetholics had alreedy failed. They had had then chones in later America for 200 years - I had only veneered the surface with a q the continent. with setting to this demanies with a hominal form q Xty which could never stand up against the real thing - Protestantion . As for the Pentecostals - they might make a large splash, but there was no way they would ever match the solid misimary advance of real chiches - like the Presbytenani, Methodiit & Beptust. Now 30 years later, But Dr. Machany of comme was right. Catholic renewal, and Pentecostal sign are no obviously the wave of the preache fiture, that there is no way to begin a study g the third- uned churches in Latin America listh Presbytenaus, Mothodists and Baptistr. Don't comt them ant - I can't let you do that but I can't be foir to letin American realities and kepin with the. Od. 27, '86 mainline Protestant denominations.

Ì

I. The Roman Cetholis.

This cruse puts to emphasis on the Protestant Churches g the third would. But in latin America the Roman Caturhis were not may there first by about 300 years; they are still first. 94 and 40 perty 100 letin Americans call (sspapini)+2 mmail) (Municipality) 101 (pertin will) themselves Catholics; only between 4 and 5 call themselves Protestant. So we must begin with the Roman Catholics, however briefly. The actual bours are (according to the World In Inc.) - by 1980: (p. 783) 1985 433,000,000 95% 34' 11 Total Christians - adherents 348, 600,000 - or 93.8% g a continental prp. y 371, 600,000. 73,20% :69 88,1 Roman Cetholics - professing 328 90000 (50,5%); affiliated 329,000,000 (88.6%) = Protestants/App/indig. - "17,798,000 (4.790) 1078 affiliated 32,037,000 (8.6%) 37,6m 20.7 5 % 12.8 3.1 % Non - religión 11,000,000 (2.9%) 5.2 1.3% Spiritus 4,353,000 (1.1%) 1,17 0.3 % Athents 2/032,000 (0.5%) 0.3 .91 0.2 Impel 1,173,000 (0.3%)

1987 sport 10. 21. Xus: 95? It is a mostable for Protestants to dismoss latin American RC 325. - 83:40 Re 326. - 83:40 Re 326. - 83:40 Re 326. - 83:40 Re 326. - 83:40 Re 32.00 Row 3.0. Chustianity as normal or Christo-papen. Too much q it is, as most No. 2. 21.9. Chustianity agree. But the anti-Catholicisin q is on iso years ago urth its peincture companisms q North American - I south American Xty -Such as the qt-groted remark: "Do Puntane came to America looking be hard; the sponish came botting be gold "- is only half-time at best, and badly out q touth with present realities in this western, homisphere. (1q)

and quies the most important single development in latin American Christianity in our time - the Roman Cetholic renewal innement. (\mathbb{I})

Catholic revenal in latin America is not new. It began in a small way back at the turn of the century. When Dr. Mackay visited the continuent on his survey in the 1950s, it was priking up effect rapidly, as he correctly observed; and in the 1960s, as my fried Darton Roberts title me in Costa Rice this summer, it continued to accelerate, even faster, under the imjetus of Vatican II (1960-65), and peaked at the great Conference of latin. American Bishops (CELAM) in Medellin, 1968. (Cancejo Episcipal Latinis americans).

It all began with a rediscovery of the Bible. Mont 1903 Pope leo II established an institute of Biblied Studies in Rome. It was, someone has said "a ticking time booms" whose pomen to explode spinitual pomen thight a chief for centuries, Comparatively mexpored to open Bible study was langely unrecognized — until the explosion came in waves of revenued. In 1943 Prins III gave fermine in the first time in translations of Scriptimes from the original tragues - a whole spate of new Spainth translations of Scriptimes from the new orders were created to translate the Bible and study t. Vatican II, at the beginning of the 1960s fling the unidows unde you for wonds of change in Catholicani. It changed Catholic attitudes troward Protostants. It save 324 under biships a unice and an the effective hearing for the first time. It admitted the need to re-evappelize lation America. Anticipating Vatican II. the lation American biships had alreedy organized themselves as a lation Omencen Synocopal Conference (CELAM) at Rio de Janeiris 1955. The second meeting of that Confere (CELAM) at Medelly in 1968 was a decisive landmanh - the high point of the Catholic Revenal an

was a decisive landmark - the high point of ted Catholic Renewal an It hight the 130 bet known hidroge treater is citation." the continuent. It is interpreted for the remet has been derembed as "a pletform for readition.":-Three points can be made, to monomize:-O It's self-prodoment on latin Am. Catholician. "For the first time in history. the laten American hierarchy recognized that the continent E had not been Christianized, but I was living in a 'articultion of sin." (Reney lenner, in Prebla of Barned, ed. J. Septem and P. Scharger, F. II., Orbin, 1950) D It's softmand of the privity of a "good for the port". And, in part, as in software O It's softmand of the privity of a "good for the port". And, in part, as in software O It's softmand of Uberation Thelappy as the RC thelappy of winsoin for LA. I But it bid and Marxim - p. 11). This part and beyond, hedellin 1968 "send shock waves through the continent and beyond, to Surge and to North America". It's story social continuity and prophetic committant

(2)

were a complete about face producedly and politically entrenched Roman Gerhothicism with which the world had become families. Reed "Pueble and Beyond, ed. by from Egelesm & Philip Scharper, if you are interested in letter American Cethothicism suice Medellin. "Rich on por, redical on reactionismy," says one commentation in that bothe (Penny lemmax), "Letter Americans were dumbforded Liky Medellin]: how could traditionally conservative histoppe have written such a do conment!

Politicelly as well as relying it was an eye-open a Nelan Rochefeller shrendly realized the here the regim for the U.S. sort. the next year. He reported two important factors that U.S. freign policy much recognize: -O An upsuge in nationalism + the determination of the people to aced social change" D His consisters "that the multican and the Church unded be the principal active in Lation America's Coming political dreme. (Thid, p. 12, citing "Quality of the Americas. Dept. of the Bulletin's Dec. 465, p. 15.

But Medellin was not guite "a platform for revolution". Swen at Medellin, the boships were divided, and after Medellin, between 1968 and the next boship's conference at Tweble, 1979, the fendulum, as it is gen does, swing back from revolution toward moderation. In Chile - the reaction polenzed Catholics: a Belgion Jesuit, Vekemans, apenly challenging the lighting leader of left-wing prests bonzalo Armyo. Empean

(3)

thestogians speaky scartinized and criticized bet the theology of liberation of which Medellini I later America in general was primed, indermining it influence at Rome. Colombie's Cardnul, Amebul Prining Dugne, leader of the densisting conservatives at Medellin spinsoned a hemosphenic seminar on 'Marxist genetration' in the church, and helped to elect the conservative Colombian bulliop Alfonso Lopez Trinjillo as the secretary general of CELONY (the Brokispi Conference). Finally, Time elected a Pope from Poland who had no ithusinis about Marxism, and emittinally would find difficulty in understand later America's pre-Marxian enthusias for revolution in a Marxian muld.

(14)

Mar. 2, 1985

The remet was Pueble, 1979, a Confine that head Pape Bart John Paul II warn against political activity and support the pastral of sporitual functions of the presthind. But it was not a total repudieturi of Medellini. It is said that Pope Alle the Pope had peen to much privety on in Mexico on his try to Pueble. Pueble, as Tume put it, may have been "a rejection of hearitary theology" but remaind "a plee for liberation from privety". (Pueble + Beyond, Hp. 34-37). In Which direction - left, wight in center - Lotin America Cethediami

will more in the Sus remains to be seen. But some canturing word man be in order before Prot gitunnt all, accept lat Am. Catholicon as so far renewed and purpied that Protestantin should abduck a leave the continuent to Reme. complacent. Early converts from Catholicism said that "there are few whom they know in the Roman Catholic Church who know the facts of Christ's life and fewer still who know Christ."¹³ Robert Speer wrote in 1913, "The very crucifixes of which South America is full misrepresent the Gospel;"¹⁴ he went on to note that "even the dead Christ is the subordinate figure. The central place is Mary's."¹⁵ The gospel simply was not being preached by the Catholic Church in the early part of this century, and thus Catholic claims that Latin America was Christian were invalid.

The view that Latin America is no longer in need of missionaries, or even evangelists, has been challenged by both Catholics and ecumenically minded Christians since the 1950s. At the 1953 Catholic Action Congress in Chimbote, Peru, some 300 Catholics from throughout the continent reached the conclusion that "the vast majority are only...nominal Catholics. "16 Likewise from the ecumenical side, Julio de Santa Ana wrote, "Latin America remains a mission field."¹⁷ Not surprisingly. this conclusion has also been reached by evangelicals like Samuel Escobar, who calls Latin America "a pagan continent with a thin veneer of Christianity."¹⁸ Thus there is widespread agreement today that the task of preaching the good news of Jesus Christ has not been accomplished in Latin America.

Why not then make common cause with the Roman Catholic Church to reach the continent for Christ? Why not work hand in hand to bring the gospel, instead of fighting hand to hand over issues that divide the Catholic from the Protestant Church? The answer to this type of question depends upon one's answer to the question. "Has the Catholic Church changed for the better in Latin America since the early 1900s?" In other words, have the divisive issues that led to the Reformation and led Protestant missionaries to enter Latin America in significant numbers since the turn of the century been resolved? The evangelicals and Pentecostals have answered, "No." The abuses that gave rise to the Reformation have not been corrected, and new ones - such as the dogma of the corporal assumption of Mary, promulgated in 1950 - have been created. The literally millions of converts from Catholicism to Protestant Christianity are nearly unanimous in this verdict. 6

There is, however, a vocal minority of Protestants involved in the ecumenical movement in Latin America who disagree. Miguel Bonino, called by C. Rene Padilla "perhaps the most outstanding Latin American Protestant theologian today,"19 wrote in 1969 that one now meets "a wholly new Catholicism, a Catholicism that is cleansed of Marian excesses, evangelized, more biblical."²⁰ The vast majority of Latin American Protestants would disagree, pointing to endemic Mariolatry, sacramentalism, papal infallibility, worship of images, prayers for the dead and to the saints, and the entire "sacrifice of the Mass" as reason enough to deny any substantial change in the Catholic Church since the Reformation. Indeed, even the immediate cause of Martin Luther's protest - the granting of indulgences from punishment in purgatory - has continued to be an integral part of the Catholic faith.²¹ Dd : 8, 86

Bonino responds to those who express their doubt that the Catholic Church has in fact changed: "People who think thus strive to interpret any Catholic renewal as a tactical maneuver or at best as only a superficial change: 'Rome changes not.'"²² A comparison of the Canon Law published in 1917 with the 1983 edition will show that in spite of modifications (use of the vernacular, etc.), Rome has in fact not changed. Even on the practical level, the "disappearance of the most eye-catching differences within folk-Catholicism,"²³ which Bonino claims has already happened, has in fact not happened. Only if one grants that Bonino is correct in asserting that the Catholic Church has changed profoundly can one accept his conclusion: "Protestant churches stand before a challenging fact of Catholic renewal, in relation to which our artificial divisions are a scandal."²⁴

Padilla, Castro, and Theo Tschuy, former secretary of the WCC Commission on Inter-Church Aid for Latin America, agree with Bonino. Padilla wrote recently that for the Protestant Church in Latin America, "the renewal of Roman Catholicism has outdated its strictly 'Protestant' role."25 Castro believes, "Today's Catholicism is fundamentally different from that which the first Protestant missionaries encountered."²⁶ This point of view naturally makes him and others who share it very open to dialogue and even active cooperation with the Roman (atholic (hurch. Costas quotes de Santa Ana approvingly: "Protestants and Catholics must increasingly seek ways to witness jointly to their common faith."²⁷ Tschuy wrote in 1969, "The Vatican Council has sprung the fetters of the past. Christians on both sides of the trench have grasped that they belong to the same Church of Christ."²⁸ He celebrates the current openness to Rome and ascribes past and present trepedation on the part of those who

PENTECOSTALS LATIN AYERICA I. The Pentecostals The Penteostals are at the other end of the ecclesuistical spectrum from the Roman Catholic. They are the second-most important religions graping on the continent - but in terms of fast growth, they are frist. They are the firstest gring segment of latin American Barter Protestantion - which in itself has shocked bisically Cetholic continent by the growth of the everychicals in a showmally Christian land .

EC 43

T

+ the World Sn. Snc. Peter Wayner groves the statistics of Prot growth: - (bok out !- p. 25) " Compriste - World En Sur + Waynes In 1900 about 50,000 1900 - 1,500,000 (applietes) grith parsed the 1,000,000 march. 19305 -1950, - parcel 5,000,000 19405 paned 2,000,000 " 10,000,00 1960, × 1950, panel 5,000,000 19705 · 20,000,000 19605 passed 10,000,000 X – 1980 10 32,000,000. 1985 " 37,600,000 as early as 1973 was already past 20, 000,000 19705 -32 million appliated Trat/Ind/My. in Lat. Am. World In. Inc. gives 1980 1985 _

Compare Wild Der Sur. : 1900- 1,660,000 applietes. 1970 - 21,740,000 1980 - 32,070,000 1985 - 37,600,000



aren't neutral in the face of sociological phenomena.

Evangelical church growth in Latin America represents a growth in thought, feeling, disposition and mentality, which is in the process of permeating all levels of Latin society.

And when I talk about the evangelical mentality, I'm not talking about an intellectual phenomenon, but spirituality.

Evangelical spirituality means the Gospel's complete transformation of a person's mind, feelings, will, relationships and plans.

The statistical analyses of church growth give data showing a certain rate of growth in a certain place at a certain time—helpful in formulating strategies and tactics. But it seems to me the Spirit of the Lord is weaving together these different threads of church growth.

What does it mean to you to be evangelical and to be Latin American?

The evangelical identity is found in Jesus Christ. We don't base our evangelical identity in an organization, but in the person of Jesus Christ our Lord. Perhaps the Christo-centric element is our fundamental, irreplaceable characteristic. Christ. And no one else but Christ.

As far as being Latin American, I feel we Latins have an obligation to the world. We've been influenced by and related to so many currents of thought from countries all over the world. I think that our Latin Americanness is affirmed in our universality.

What does that say about world evangelicalism?

Evangelical thought today isn't North American or Latin American or European or African or Asian. Today, evangelical thought is international in nature.

Think about leaders in the Lausanne movement. Who is more respected theologically. . . Tom Houston of Scotland or Samuel Escobar of Peru? Peter Kuzmic of Yugoslavia or Harvey Conn of the United States?


This is evangelical thought at the international level. The old geographic divisions we've tried to maintain are becoming a thing of the past. □

Four Factors Boost Evangelical Growth

Latin America Evangelist's Paul Pretiz, with almost 40 years' experience in Latin America, suggested these factors contributing to the recent accelerated growth of Latin evangelical churches.

External circumstances: Socio-political crises have made people spiritually open. Some writers see the flow into evangelical churches as an escape from reality, but there's another way of looking at this: that the ultimate reality is God's sovereignty over history and our lives.

Another factor is disenchantment with the Roman Catholic Church, ranging from not enough priests to go around, to rebellion against the religious establishment, to people seeing contradictions between Scripture and church teachings.



Mobilization. Where believers are motivated to reach their friends, the movement grows. Here is where the Latin Pentecostals excel. People in many churches may recognize cerebrally they should witness, but they are fearful and unmotivated. In contrast, the Pentecostals' teaching empowers them to witness.

A subpoint of this is the socioiogical fact of a critical mass being reached. If only 1% in a country are witnessing to their friends, that is a start. But when 20% are actively witnessing, there is exponential growth.

The flexibility of church structures helps. For instance, Assemblies of God churches train people through every possible means: seminaries, night schools, correspondence programs and day programs. So they have a surplus of available people to start new congregations. These lay leaders identify more with the common people than the priests or more traditional Protestant pastors.

Theological reasons. Underlying it all is Latin evangelicals' very nonuniversalistic approach to the church's task. They firmly believe not everyone will be saved, and that people must be brought to personal repentance and faith.

Also, while evangelicals may criticize the <u>Roman</u> Catholic Church, it has succeeded in giving Latins a basic concept and reverence for God, Christ and Scripture.

Evangelical workers in Latin America do not have to start with a basic explanation of the Christian God, as missionaries do in Asia, for instance. There is a basic credulity (and I use the word in the positive sense). This is to the advantage of the Gospel.

(6)

them the Methodist mission in Chile had ever seen before. You might have expected them to rejoice in that at least, repardless g what they thought g the reported visions. But as Peter Wagner describes it in his book, "Look Out! The Pentecostals the Coming (Hp. 16-18), then reaction was just the approte. "Open man festations of spiritual priver were opensive to many ... local newspaper poked from at these religions fametics. The methodist Missimary Society in N.Y., hearing reports about "raising of hands, the baption of fire, mureiles of faith healing, is sure, ... tangues, propecies, predicting the date of Chins's attan, falling dome under the prover of the Holy Spint. " began to have don'ts about its mussioning, Home, " have have and hefre long the Mothodistic had briced him out. They seemed to have projetter what happened Hoover, quite understandebly, simply started a very church, in 1910. The Methodist Pentocostal Chunch, he called it. Its menuhershyp today is about 400,000. The old Methodit Chul of Chile which three him out has 20,000 (50 times smaller). They claimed it was the dent behind the goings on in the Pentecostal chuch. But as Wagner remarks, " Many of them have since andered at lond poit on where side the dent might really have been" (8.18). A little n both sides, perhaps. Pride, anogue, and but eventual orthodoxy a one side. Suthaning gue the but a brasine divisioness in the other. These Chilean Ponto costalist, have sine their begings in 1910. speit into methon 20 schwins since (loud in Sw. - b. 229).

And lest you think Asie is still too for away, let me remind you that in the next so years, if present trends continue

* . .

r . ••

a .

--

,

٠. -

· · ·

• • •

Now let me me to Bright.

In 1909, the same year the Chilean night watchman saw his vision of Christ - the vision that led to the beginning of Chilean fenteustalism - an an untern Thalian immigrant in Chicago, what this Franceson, who had received the spit of the Spirit and had spichen in tongues in the North Arenne Mission in that city felt a strong and unexpected call, direct from the lord, he said, to go to South America. He had already started some new chunches in Penne. + Calij. which grew into what is now the Christian Chich of North America (H, 500 menters in 1975). Then three of is who sometimes question how directly the bod atter Christianis claims of direct, immediate, in ministrikeble guidance on the part of some chamsmittee is I be hard put to it to a argue with hancesim's assertion that it was indeed the bod who led him to leave his work in the U.S. A. In new work in Brazil. His Churtian Chuch & North America is mu, a denommation unmbering 11, 500 members, But the child the had called him to plant in Brazil, the Christian Congregation of Brazil at has a million members, making it the me of the for largest a demonimitions in all latin America.

He began his lating Conversion ministry in Law Paulo, Whe Paul, who went put to the gives in each city on his musimary privay, (18

honceson, as an Italian went pust to the Italians - in Buenos and then Sono Paulo. To his amezount be discued that Sao Paulo had an 1,300,000 Italians. He find a number of them in a Presbyteman child there, and was insted to preach they in Italian. But as with the Methodists in Chile, when the property the Presbytenairs in Brazil it to many were deeply mmed by Francescon's preaching, when he touched on the matter A speaking with trugues, as Poter Wagner reports (look Out!, p 23), were very dubinis I some were anony. Tensions mareased, I the result was a chunch split. Three who left the Presbytanian chich inth louis noncescon became the first congregation of the Congregacian Cristo us Brazil. The Prestation child in Sev Paulo Bis which they left has only a few hundred members. Tentecostal Congregations of Christ ander gren so rajudly that they have milt a number of clubes which seat over 5,000 members each and the demonination as a while her loss, on adults, I a that monchers hig y à million.

(19)

This seems to be the pattern in latin America. Heth Manchine chunches, Mathodist, Tresbyterion, Baptist plant the seed for thinkly, build the fondations smally, carry a fartiful missionary work for years, (mezze land affel idi - 6,756, 200 (began 1910) 1 tembro : - 2,944 614 (kegan with low switch 102 - 1853 continuo und) WX Sur the - 2 500,000

> But bord, who write in mysterins were, proceeds to grant the morease, at the church growth, to the Pentecostals. Don't jump to have generalizations, it is not time in Arie, Africe, Europe n North Americe - at least not the red - the chird Pentecostals are (North Americe - at least not the red - the chird Pentecostals are growing in these other continents, but have not a so states). growing in these other continents, but have not a so states states. Take the largest Portestant (evappelical) denomination south of the border - the America of the proceeded denomination south of the border - the America of the proceeded of the second or refeated there - they began vist as Methodoots as in Chile, n Proceeded the Chirts Connection of the state of the second of the second of the other of the Chirts Connection of the second of the second of the second of the border - they began vist as Methodoots as in Chile, n

D

Thes leftenans as with the Christian Congregation of Brazil - the Assemblies of God of Brezil began in a Baptust church.

In 1909 - that year 1909, you will remember, was a proster year in the history of Pertecostation in later Americe -

En 1909 bris haven belt his "strong compulsion to got let America - the Copyegicas. In 1909 the Chilean night with through the discriming gene Chint and in 1909 two Swedes - Swedick inimprants in Smith Bend, Ind. at a small chairsmetric through meeting, received a "prophecy" telling them to go to "Pare". They had here hered y Pare - but went to the public lebrary to look it up - I food that one g the states in Brezil is named Pare. They had a only emphanents to go as for

A ministry of the Baptist competation in Belen followed Verpien and Berg out of the church and formed their own wrishipping fellowship, which, as we have been has proven since 1910 with the largest Protestant denomination in all of latin Americe - ad, in fact, the largest Protestant denomination in the 3rd world. (The Assemblues of lord of Prezie). As these stones, Pentecostal beginnings show the mile of Pentecostation anywhere presents some difficienties to church historians. Their and histories the Pentecostal histories of their churches - are largely anecdotal, not analytic. They are to may preaching and engine the bod's presess to write extended histories. And how does a historian witespret the stories. When a Pentecostal says "The hord that we to go to later America" - does he mean by word, or by vision, or by dream, or by some subjectively felt impulse, and how can the professional historian be some that it was really the lord who tots him to go, or that it watters them the prometing Pentecostalis missionian's and stories held feeling of constraint on the area which may or may with the bod. 22

Another public is Pertecistal statistics. Church statistics are always interindy "soft" statistics - that is, a little vague and prody recorded. Pertecistal statistics are even more so. Fast-graving churches are too bury graving to spend time recording -, and But at least there's no greation that the Pertecs which is why it is difficult to get a precise fix on just how fast they are graving. In grangh: W.R. Read, who has collaborated on the best chud-gravit status in Breziel, has had to pring benilterugily back and forth, up and down in his estimates of the gravit getter Amenblus of God, just Since 1964.

In 1964 (in New Patterns & Church Growth in Bragil) he baid 950,000 (In 1967 he revised the freme to In 1970, to bring the freme into line with put statutio, he dropped it TYC. You 950,000 communicat Meanting the Assemblies of Good themselves were claiming 2, 057, 000 beptyed member plus _____ Atta adult members Total - 2, 783,000 The new Wild Chinton Encyclopedia reputs 2,783,000 adults and total aft. - 4,000,000. The denomination steef reputs, in 1978 3.1 million adult ch. members + 2.5 mill, adhereit = 5, 400,000. But repardless of the most string nature of chick statistics, they are, as Trin Roper Schutz, of the Protestant monastic order at Taize' is justed as suping - "Statistics are "pipes from Good". "Statistics are aginfrom bord" Suping - "Statistics are "pipes from Good". "(Would to Sme., y. 123), I these "spins from Good " in later America bid us take the Pentecostals very Renowsly -A recent estile (1977) by Data Roberts (6. A. Everydist, Mart/Apr. 1977, J. 104.) fortestant ligos there were by than 900000 Protestant Christians in later America, virtually une of them Pentecostal (WYn Inc., p. 782 - of Roberts, 100,000 hid. 8mg) (- I loss than 100,000 bigthzed adult member (RALets Let. Am. Ev., Kad/Mp. 1977, p. 10). In the early 1950, half a centry leter, there were & million, less than half g whom were Particistal, but Tenterstale were beginning to explode, as Markey printed int. By the mid-60, the first entited child growth study (by Wm. Read, H. Johnson + Victor Montenso, later American Cl. Smith, 1969) discovered that there were some than 10 million Protestand his, I that 2 mt 2 every about 62 million. Horee were portecostal, Today, out y some 32 million Protestante in latin America -

Par

23

The greatest strength of the Pentecstals is in Preside Chile and there Mexics (RNest), and they are the largest grouping also in Argentine, Peru, Ecnedor, Colombia, Panema, El Salveda - A Hondurso as well. Socio-religions studies show, says Degter Roberts of Coste Rice, that thead timed Pentecostation " for its greatest appeal aning the less printiged masses of undering peoples. offering them a dimension of supersatured reality in their Churtan inferience they had failed to bind in the superstation of their pressions follow Netigin " But it has not remained statically lines class. " Conversion, Western from degrading wies, education - these have from ded an upward poried mobility of comiderable impact." (L. A. E., p. 11)

generally speaking there are three types of chansmetrics: "the traditional Pertecostals, "the "renewed" on chansmetric Protestants in the main line churches, and "the chansmetric atholics. In latin America, some Pentecostals, Days Robert, "uneld doubtless prefer to be labeled 'chansmetrics', a term that seems to play down the 'torques aspect of the Pentecostal expensive in fairs of the more inward 94th of the spirit. As a metter of fact, many of the traditional Pentecostal groups that may have started with a strong emphasis on 'storoladic' have mined 24

to a stage where triques is no longer the major distinctive of their "The sumer shows that holo of the partors in the old hethodist Peuter. a. of the have never speller in triguesproture on "The reality of their feath is replicted more in their type of wriship and everypelism, sometimies blurring the line of distinction between them the. "Peute enter"] and 'renewed' Protestants and the charismetric Cetholics." (Riberto)

25

To quite Wagner again, "It is more a dynamic more than a constallized theology [this Pentocostalism]. You can tell the Pentecostalis more by what they do than by what they teach. Not all Pentecostals speak in tryenes, but none for had speaking in tryenes... It mylit be easier than we think for un-Pentecostal churches to 'Pentecostalize' themselves without doctrinal compromise. In other unds, non-Pentecostals mylit do well to service the providity of behaving more idee Pentecostals even if they do not choose to behaving more idee Pentecostals

"In any case," concludes Roberts, "the Pentecostal majority Lin later America I is a fact of life, the other fourth of the Protestant community cannot your ... The Pentecostals are here to stay and are valued member of the Body of Churst ... "

D Wappen, p. 36, citing Read, Munterano + H. Johnson, Later American Ch. brouth, Eerdaws, 1969, p. 37).

Orlande Costas sums up tios analysis of the Pentecostals south of the border in 6 pros, and 5 cms (lat. An. Engelist. Hach/App. 1970, p. cof.) The pros: the six strengths of the momement. D This Chint-centeredness. Contray I traditional Ventecostation Three thertogy by a large has been Spinit-contered the latin chainsmethes bere then concept of Spinit a His gifts in Churit Himself. Their use of Good's und. When the Reformers, they take the BAle away from the priests and gen it to the laity. 3) Their spinituality of "me". Unlike some Pentecostals who empressive a spinituality of "provor" - theirs is a spinituality of me not empassizing prover to speak in trypus or cest out dommes but to give themselves t others without country the cost. D Then followship in the church. Is the chairs matic, the chil is promonly a fellowship not a tool for aganization. The internal economicity which is an ecumenicity of institutions, an openingation for chile munin; the ecumenicity of the chairs matrice is personal I informal, open to all who have in common the experies of the Spirit. Warpelin as Disciple making, Their evolution is not derected just to the goal of winning people to Chinit, but to forming converts into "authoritic followers of Climit". They do not divince the offers of the Gospel from its domando The cons: but there are problem areas in the movement: -(Middle-class orientation . Thigh sting any unless - its socio-political manteting is middle class (family + chid centered) not concerned about structure @ Neglect q Climit's Humanity - emphanizing his lordship, forgetting his serventhood, 3) Arethority of Scripture - the damper of giving a higher authority to unniedicte revelations from the Spirit than to the clean teaching of Suptan -I spirituality without who . A tendency to fair to downstrate the efficacy of sportful pomer in concrete situations (Vertical pastoral authority. Note "how a moment strady critical of the contemporary chicks institutional imprisonment, falls pray tell to a vertical pastoral structure, with a hierarchical authority that pesses down from Chint to the shepherds, to their disciples and their disciples disciples. The und they use is goling together " a subjugation" - highly authoritarian and in effect damying the peedon of the Spirit of Which they boast. NN. 29, 1982

259

Sender - payers.

25 a

B. Chairsmetres

(middle dan)

Puble dan)

4. Modern Chanismetre - quite different from the alone: less emphases in torques, strong to strong Bible study + emphasis on Chint-centeredness (H.S. never separated from Churt) like the traditional Participate, they question all chick structures, but mlike the traditional Parte costals they are less leader-centered, less authoritarien and emphasize collegiclety is administration. Plymonth Brethren influence is strong, the the best known everyelist. Juan Carlos Artiz, mud born the Plymith Brethum to the Amenberg Good Chile, Argentini - and was expelled by the Assemblues for questioning that church's structure + authority. He is every willing to work with Cetholic chairs matrix - who bely to the west grap. 5. Treditional Chich Choins metris - betty Cathlie & Protestant. Very strong anny Mennmites, I some q the older Faith Mission boads, like the lature American Muisin. Accept tongues, but do not repard this as indisfenselle. Tend to be better educated a En education: 2, 4 and 5 are some middle class. 1, 3 are loves class.

256

(C). Mus cellaments .

Perhaps L.A. Pentecstation a best understood as a renewal must leading chustimis from a prevailing nominal chustionity to pennel, acting 24ty. See wet there (2 // Sts mugin characteristic is not really emotionalisming quite and musicles, but lay enoughering () and a complete conviction in the reality of the supervictural - that life has more than a this-implied discussion

Two fundamental 26 There 2 characteristics are, I believe, the mainsprip of its strength. what makes the Penticostation atmatice to letury Americans that they are joining their chunches by the millions - Many records have been progetted. I will list only a few in not Spirit-cartered bil Nt- contered . 1. The lapnes. There is an attraction to crowds, perhaps, in latin. America - and the baggist churches are almost always pentecostal seating 5 to 10,000. 6 2. This anotimation. In the pros, there are few times of fuedom to rejnice, to laugh it shout and sing, in a way that most traditional churches seen to prom on. They like the the its shorthing and chapping. Even its preaching style is is simples, more drematic, more direct. . En the Pentecostal," in unites Roberts, " it must at least be said that it is fin to go to church. . It's imquestining supernaturalism. It has princtimes been asked by isiting North American Theologians, why the Partecistalist and not the liberation Devlopions attract the poor and the common people, When it is the liberation Theolograms and not the Pentecostaliste who make such a point of " Therbogy for the poor ? Perhaps the reason is simply that a "theology be the porr" is essentially patronizing, and the pros instructurely react against it. If liberation Reologiains were pomen - ad then therbosy a therbosy of instead of the pon, they might be competitive in betw Americe outside the classrooms - but so for

in a hard and injust unld, Pentecostalism seems to offer mine freedom of worship and expression, at least in church, and more hope for the forture, if not in this would then in the next, them the me politically mented and me upper class Theologies of the seminaries. If that is escapisin, as a Marxist hund call it well their it is, in a way. But the Marxists have always underestimated the revolutioning impact of a for Churitain forth that has always hed its home in two woulds - this me, and the next, - and it whose eternal hope, not in this one but the next. Perhaps that is another reason for Pentecostal appeal in the midst of injustice in lat. America. Some call it "body life"- which is the religinis constant of social activism. "". It's activism. Pentecostals activity to be are not so politically active as some much have them be - at least as chunches. But they are for more religinish active than most of their counterparts in Cetholicisin on Protestantion; In Pentecostation is essentially a lay momement there. ("Bordy Lips" is the active Lips of the Bordy of Chinit on the Chind. It is a term popularized by a mon-Perite costal.) This a becomes Strikenply apparent in Peter Wagner's description if the Brezil for Christ Chuch, in Saw Paulo, Brezil. The Deviet of Pentecritat gruth is an acture laity - laymen . laymonen acture in evengelismi. The White church becomes involved.

27

The Brazil for Christ Chich in Sao Paulo, is led by one if the best known Penteestal leaders in the world, Manuel de Malo. It has recently completed construction of its main sanctuary - a huge building Which peaks 25,000 unshuppers. de Melo calle it "the breit chuch in hit ust any more. (Knew) - the perhaps to child bille, seats uns than any other the und "- and it probably a - But insist it on a Sunday humaning - of Wayner nisted the old sanctuary - which set 5,000, on a Sunday mong with its mile and a half of pews - and find only 100 people there. Where are the 5,000? " The fire through," says Wagnes, " meet in Thursday and Saturday inghts, [and] on Sunday are and Where active Chustians are supposed to be, according to Mennel de Melo. They are back in Their neighborhoods winning new people to Christ and gathering them together in doughter churches ... In the capital area A Sas Paulo almo a total of 1,496 new churches and congregations have been planted by enthusiastic members of the Brezil for Christ Church.

This explains why Textecritals need ferrer ontide musimaires. In 1970 - Latin America's non-Pointecritals had 90% of the missimaires, but only 37% of the members, while Pertecritals had 10% of the missimaires 'in the a Whopping 63% of the members' (Wagner, citing takin american Ch. brouth p. 57) 5. Concern for the immediate needs of the poor. Rentecostals are accused of lock of assial encome in latin America. It is true that they do not give much tight to the great, overarching structures of courty. The poor rarely do. But they know where the poor hunt most - and it is there that they there is evident and most effective. Their churches are grea to the such, and they pray for them, and many are healed. Most cent afford a hispatel any way.

29

There are some dramatic cases of faith healing recorded in Peter Wagner's book link but The Pentecostals are Coming, chop. 9, pp. 121 H. and if you need that chapter, nemember that Wagner was noted in laten america when he was a minimized there, for his naturally circulated articles against built healing. (p. 123). A Pentecostal preacher pair it thus way: -"Chinot healed spiritually and physicelly... He died to sawe; He lives to heal." (Wagner, Linkart, p. 146).

6. Their parameters y social concern.

Cutinsins of the Rentecostals D lack a social activism The best critical pludies by a sociologists of the Peritecostal

moment in later America are:

Christien Caline, Haven q the News - on Chilean Peritecostation, and a NCC publicitier Emilie Willems, Followers y the New Faith (Neshulle: Vanderbilt, 1967). The first is most appreciative of the Pentecostals, lant as might be expected of a WCC commusimed study in 1969, just after the anothetinary 1965 Conferce on Chile Al Society, he pounds away at the Pentecostal lack of social concern and mortivement in fann g an emphasis in fersonal, moral reform.

(30)

"Pertecostation teaches its initiates withdrawal and passisty in sour political matters, limited only by the commandment to be Submusice to authority ... These components make it in the last analysis a frice in order retties than an element of progress, a defender q the status que and not a promoter q charpen (lelive, p.145).

The other study, by the Vanderbill Univ. sociologisty, is more independent and more printine. Taking Brezil and Chile as examples, he doministrates that the growth of the Pentecostals, has in fact given them have Dociel and political clint. then the abover-growing but more articulate activists of the mainting minersities and perminaries. But it is true that they are quite consciently un-political and conservative. As lative puts it, " they put

quest emphasis on cleaning up the furnel two life, Ebut I do not seem equelly concerned about cleaning up the world around them." (Wagnes, y. 140 This may be indeed a lack of whoteness in their grapel, but it is not necessarily bad, as Dean Kelley product out a few years ogs, in What they conservation Chelley product out a few years ogs, in What they conservation Chelley forming (1972). Postecostals believe fimily in the printy of the altimate spiritual deviencin of life one the immediate physical deviension. (Wagnes, p. 141).

Inald Palmer, of Trinity Div. School, writing a Th.H. Thesis on The bouth of the Pentecostal Chuches in Clombia (1972) ashed a cross section of pastors the question 'Do you believe that the Evangelial chich anget to concern itself more with the social problems of the country and declare itself with respect to to these publicus?". Non-Perticontal parties replied "Yes". But the partors of the United Penteustal demonination there, which is only 12 years old but already ontrumber the 126 year-old Press. Ch. g Chombia 95,000 member to 21,000, becoming in the process the largest Protestant deummation in the contry, all said "No'- no plitical involvement". (Compare chich membership in Clombie United lente costal Chambin (1970) 95,000 This Synak Sortal (1942) 70,000 712 Day Adventist (1421) 60,000 Presbytenin (1856) 21,000.

3

The United Parteestel partne not may append social issue involvement, they appear Churitani connection with organized athletics, politics is labor mum. Yet they are a unking class church. It is admiss as if they carel nothing for protice - they are to concerned with party cosies. As Themes reports - women may not cut their hair; members may intracted dances, theaters, social matches. Television, radio and Decuder music are considered wouldly. Their all themeal wome puts it being bluttly, "we worm all 4 our believes to abstein from any 4 these pretices in the interest of spiritual granth and the some coming of music (cited by Palmer, guilted by Wayner, p. 143).

But that is an extreme case. In general, the Pentecostel position is more balanced — but prinities are very clearly defined. Wayner pays, "Intuitively Pentecostals understand that their resources are limited, and that devisions as to the degree of social mirilinement boil down ultimately to a mater of prinities". And to them, "There is witting to as important as getting [meansis hearts right with God. The caster humt be just right before the periphery can be connected ..." (Wayner, 19.144 - the last publicies how Malin Hares, CA Sec. for As. of God, "A lanteentel's View of Musicin Strategy, IRM, July 1965, p. 307)

NN.7 80

(32)

strive to interpret any Catholic renewal as a tactical maneuver or at best as only a superficial change: 'Rome changes not.'"²² A comparison of the Canon Law published in 1917 with the 1983 edition will show that in spite of modifications (use of the vernacular, etc.), Rome has in fact not changed. Even on the practical level, the "disappearance of the most eye-catching differences within folk-Catholicism,"²³ which Bonino claims has already happened, has in fact not happened. Only if one grants that Bonino is correct in asserting that the Catholic Church has changed profoundly can one accept his conclusion: "Protestant churches stand before a challenging fact of Catholic renewal, in relation to which our artificial divisions are a scandal."²⁴

Padilla, Castro, and Theo Tschuy, former secretary of the WCC Commission on Inter-Church Aid for Latin America, agree with Bonino. Padilla wrote recently that for the Protestant Church in Latin America, "the renewal of Roman Catholicism has outdated its strictly 'Protestant' role." 25 Castro believes, "Today's Catholicism is fundamentally different from that which the first Protestant missionaries encountered."²⁶ This point of view naturally makes him and others who share it very open to dialogue and even active cooperation with the Roman (atholic (hurch. Costas quotes de Santa Ana approvingly: "Protestants and Catholics must increasingly seek ways to witness jointly to their common faith."27 Tschuy wrote in 1969, "The Vatican Council has sprung the fetters of the past. Christians on both sides of the trench have grasped that they belong to the same Church of Christ."28 He celebrates the current openness to Rome and ascribes past and present trepedation on the part of those who

The Tentecatals

The Evangelical Groundswell in Latin America

GUILLERMO COOK

Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. By David Martin. Blackwell, 352 pp., \$29.95.

Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth. By David Stell, University of California Press, 399 pp., \$24.95.

Crisis in Latin America: An Evangelical Perspective.

By Emilio A. Núñcz C. and William D. Taylor. Moody Press, 439 pp., \$19.95.

THESE THREE BOOMS American common interest in Latin American HESE THREE BOOKS share a Protestantism. The first two analyze its recent explosive growth, though from quite different perspectives. David Martin, the British author of A General Theory of Secularizatian, sets out to demonstrate grand patterns in religious movements, with a functionalist's passion for social equilibrium. David Stoll, a graduate student in anthropology and the author of a critical study of the Wycliffe Bible Translators, focuses more specifically on grass-roots religious phenomena and presents a structuralist's critique. Martin devotes less space to Central America-a principal focus of Stoll's study-than to the larger nations in the region. While Martin centers more specifically on Pentecostalism, Stoll's concern is the entire evangelical movement. Martin's main sources are the enormous pool of available research on Latin American religious phenomena, while Stoll's study relies to a great extent on his own field research and on unpublished documents. Martin's approach is deductive, Stoll's more inductive. Yet despite their different approaches, their conclu-

Guillerma Coak has lived for many years in Casta Rica. Argentine barn, he is affiliated with the Latin American Mission and serves as associate general secretary of the Latin American Theolagical Fraternity. sions come close at one key point (a point further explored by Emilio Núñez and William Taylor): the latent capacity for critical social awareness that resides in Latin American Protestantism.

For Martin, the growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America is a logical extension of the centuries-old clash of two imperial visions, the result of which are the Hispanic and English civilizations. Today's heirs of the Roman hierarchical tradition are confronted again-successfully, Martin believes-by Anglo-style voluntarism with its legacy of popular dissent. Meanwhile, an authoritarian Catholic Church finds it increasingly difficult to compete with egalitarian social ideals and with the wide variety of choices Protestantism offers. It has attempted three defensive strategies with ambiguous results: 1) church-state alignment and religious intolerance, 2) political alignments and indoctrination (Catholic Action and Christian Democracy), and 3) liberation theology and the base communities.

In his introductory chapters Martin traces through Northern Europe and North and South America the three overlapping waves of Protestant cultural revolution-Puritanism, Methodism (the Evangelical Revival) and Pentecostalism. These movements have arisen more or less at the periphery of the establishment. Surveying Latin America in four brief chapters, Martin argues for the role of early Methodism as a paradigm for understanding the social function of Pentecostalism as it takes root in Latin countries. He then discusses the social and religious implications of Pentecostal "reformations": spiritual communications (tongues and healings-vehicles of liberation within an oral tradition), conversions (personal and familial), and evolving attitudes toward economic and political involvement.

In Europe voluntarism stagnated and died, but it flowered in North America. The growth of Protestantism in Latin America is in part a function of the powerful and religiously motivated presence

of the United States, Britain's imperial successor. The author calls this the "Americanization of Latin American religion"-a fact which, he rightly points out, is resented by many Latin Americans. The other side of the coin is the creative "Latinamericanization of American religion." The role and potential of Pentecostalism is a function of both its past and present roots. Its origins lie in a diffcrentiated society, where religion operated primarily at the level of culture. As it became rooted in a nondifferentiated world where voluntarism threatens the entire social order, Pentecostalism has had to adapt. While it allows for a variety of options ad intra, it guards itself from a hostile environment by a non-Methodist passivity and acceptance of the status auo.

Yet, says Martin, the transformational potential of the Pentecostal "social strike fram society" (vs. the Marxist "strike against society") should not be underestimated. As they increase in numbers and maturity Pentecostals will become more secure and perhaps more aware of their social responsibilities. The author points out (as does Stoll) that while "sophisticated" Protestants may be more concerned about the poor, grass-roots Pentecostals are more successful with the poor. He reminds us that many of the idealswomen's rights, world peace, rejection of capital punishment-that "radical" groups espouse today were incubated within the closed confines of religious "sects" like the Bohemian Brethren, Mennonites, Quakers and Swedenborgians. These observations merit serious consideration

Nonetheless there is a serious flaw in Martin's methodology. Broadly generalized models of history, à la Spengler or Toynbee, inevitably run into contradictions. Such is the case here. To paint the English and Iberian worldviews in such black-and-white colors smacks of the same sort of cultural imperialism the author decries. And as Martin himself admits, "voluntarism" has also been coercive, as has been the case with U.S. deal-

ings with oppressed peoples in Latin America and even within its own borders. Further, his model is too pat. Voluntarism is not an Anglo monopoly. The underside of Roman Carbolic history is peppered with seditious sects that appeared long before the Protestant Reformation. The most recent instance of Hispanic voluntarism is the Catholic base communities-which the author mentions only once, and in a patronizing way. To dismiss them, as he does, as "incipiently Protestant . . . instruments" of the Catholic Church which also "threaten its structure" is to miss the point entirely. The base communities also present a serious challenge to Protestant authoritarianism and are a threat to U.S. hegemony. At times Martin gives the impression of trying to shoehorn diverse religious experiences-and the complexity of Latin America, the English Caribbean, South Korea and South Africa-into one neut package.

Martin's approach to social conflict is typical of a functionalist analysis: systemic ills are seen more as dysfunctions to be decried and restored to proper balance than as fundamental ills to be redressed. This may explain why a pivotal event such as the 1932 peasant insurgency in El Salvador is mentioned only as it affected the Pentecostal churches' "prosperity." He takes a similar approach to the "electronic church." In like manner, in discussing Protestant growth in Guatemala, he makes only passing reference to Protestant political polarization and to the endemic violence there. Again, in describing socioeconomic changes affecting Ecuadoran Quechuas as a result of Protestant missions, Martin barely alludes to Catholic Bishop Leonidas Proaño's hardwon agrarian reform which made the changes possible. Neither does he mention the ambiguous role of North American missions and relief agencies such as World Vision, which Stoll discusses in some detail.

Martin's overreliance on the research of others and on interviews with North American personnel has left him open to glaring factual errors and unfortunate omissions. The Latin American Mission, to which he attributes certain actions in Guatemala, does not even operate in that country. His information on dissident religious movements is incomplete and on occasion incorrect and simplistic. For

example, he falsely ties the Confraternidad Evangélica of Guatemala to the guerrillas. To claim such a relationship is irresponsible, because it imperils lives. And at least at one point his logic fails him: the reversal from the highly mediated hierarchical church to a nonmediated Pentecostal "cell" requires, he says, the "unequivocal leadership" of a pastor, of "folds and safe enclosures." Are pastors and folds not mediations? Throughout Latin America, certain Protestant ministries are becoming, to quote a Spanish saying, "more popish that the pope." All of this notwithstanding, I suspect that Martin's basic conclusion regarding the transformational potential in Pentecostalism may turn out to be entirely valid.

AVID STOLL challenges the fundamentalist stereotypes of both the left and the right. Though an avowed nonbeliever, he has a keen understanding of the Protestant evangelical ethos. A longtime supporter of justice eauses, he can be as critical of liberation theology and of liberal stereotypes as of the shibboleths of the religious right. And lest conservatives take too much comfort in his pred ations about Protestant ascendancy in Latin America, he suggests that the evangelicalism that is on the horizon may become more socially involved than its present image would indicate. He handles his topic with a good ear for the apt statement and with tongue-in-cheek irony, though at times he lapses into glibness.

Stoll has two objectives. First, he says, "for readers alarmed by evangelical growth, I want to provide a sense of its open-ended nature." Evangelicalism, he insists, "is a generator of social change whose direction is not predestined." To blame this growth on right-wing religious groups and U.S. imperialism—as many do—implies, he says, a profound distrust of the poor and of their ability to "turn an imported religion to their own purposes."

When he began his research, Stoll suspected that the conspiracy theory as *the* explanation of Protestant growth was exaggerated. The Iran-contra scandal disabused him. His second objective speaks to this issue, "For evangelicals, I wish to dramatize the danger of allowing their missions to be harnessed to United States militarism by the religious right." Accordingly, the initial chapters of Stoll's work deal with the invasion of the sects and with the Catholic Church's approaches to the various threats to its ancient hegemony—the Protestant onslaught in particular.

Stoll devotes almost half the book to a carefully nuanced discussion of the ideology, activities and historical context of the Protestant movements that have setiled in Latin America, right up to the coming of the religious right. His typologies are helpful in untangling a complex maze of interrelationships. In three of his chapters he presents case studies of Protestantism in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) and Ecuador (the role of World Vision). His conclusion-a reinterpretation of "the invasion of the sects as an Evangelical Awakening"-----is bound to raise hackles on both sides of the issue. It is here that Stoll states the questions that have dogged him throughout his research: "Why should a religion which appears to work against the interests of the people help them in their struggle for survival?" Why is conservative Protestantism more successful at attracting the masses than a theology that is so explicitly concerned for the liberation of the masses?

Stoll argues that the impressive Protestant growth, with allowances made for the "revolving door effect," cannot be ascribed entirely to the right-wing sects. The reasons are more complex. He hints strongly that the growing conservatism of Rome may be partly to blame, as Catholics find less and less room in their church for freedom of the spirit. Stoll further insists that "evangelicals provided an ideology, not just of political resignation, as so often noted, but of personal improvement." Indeed, evangelical conversion may have become for the masses a more peaceful outlet for revolutionary fervor than the political message of liberation. While liberation theology has raised people's consciousness, it has also raised expectations beyond its proponents' capacity to deliver. Meanwhile, Pentecostal churches and Protestant relief agencies are delivering more immediate material results without setting off unmanageable class and ethnic confrontations. Tactical errors by the insurgents in Guatemala during José Efrain Ríos Montt's rule drove into the arms of right-wing churches entire Mayan villages that had first sought guerrilla protection from the army.

Stoll's analysis is given more weight by a study recently issued by CEDI, a Brazilian ecumenical documentation and information center, which found that Catholic base community members in that country are joining Pentecostal churches in large numbers. Pentecostalism, the refuge of the masses? Perhaps, but Stoll hints that these new converts may not have entirely forsaken their radical awareness-and as Protestant growth collides with increasing impoverishment, more opportunities for radicalization arise. The gospel, defined "in terms of social justice as well as personal salvation, has the potential to appeal to the millions of evangelicals whose economic position is deteriorating." Indeed, grassroots Protestant congregations, says Stoll, may be going through the same process of awareness-raising as did the Catholic base communities in the '50s.

There are things to quarrel with in Stoll's book. In dealing with Nicaragua, for example, he gives the same weight to all his sources, apparently without exercising "ideological suspicion." He strives to achieve objectivity by balancing off the consistent brutality of the right with the occasional excesses of the left. Moreover, his faith in the power of "enlightened self-interest" to transform individualistic autocrats into democrats has little substance. To his credit, Stoll acknowledges that he has spent less time studying radical Christian movements than he has conservative Christianity. His case for the existence of a more "open-ended" evangelicalism would have been stronger had he studied the scores of struggling grass-roots agencies that model themselves on the Radical Reformation. While he devotes more space to the Catholic base communities than does Martin, he is seemingly unaware of their influence on grass-roots Protestantism;

nor does he understand their symbiotic relationship to liberation theology. As a telling instance of his misinformation, he calls the Catholic base communities "ecclesiastical"—i.e., institutional rather than ecclesial—i.e., churchly in nature despite contrary ecclesiastical strictures.

Stoll's comment that "liberation theology may be better at filling faculties, bookshelves, and graves than churches" no doubt will be celebrated by the enemies of that movement. But it is both callow and unfair, implying that this theology is primarily academic and elitist (though he may be partly right if he is

referring primarily to a handful of dilettantish Protestants). If liberation theology were merely a classroom exercise, it would be no threat to the powers of church and state. Graves have been filled wherever downtrodden people have cried "Enough!" Liberation theology is more a product of this outcry than its cause. And because "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church," there is also an underground evangelical church that is growing quantitatively. Neither Stoll nor Martin seems to be aware of this fact. To be sure, the numerical growth of Latin American Protestantism also builds upon the sacrifice of some early martyrs at the hands of Roman Catholics-an ugly chapter in Latin American history which could repeat itself in some fanatical enclaves.

Not all growth, however, should be celebrated. Nor is numerical success, as both Martin and Stoll seem to imply, the only criterion for assessing the impact of Protestantism on Latin American society. Ecclesiastical "poaching," the "revolving door effect," raises questions about the extent of that growth. There are also theological grounds for questioning numerical increase which is built upon a distorted understanding of the kingdom of God.

The alarming growth of heretical "sects" (a term I use cautiously) also concerns responsible evangelicals. Indeed, rapid, superficial growth may backfire. In Costa Rica there is reliable evidence of recent retrenchment following a period of growth, with defections even to Catholicism.

M Y OBJECTIONS notwithstanding, I find a number of Stoll's conclusions to be substantially correct. Let me mention a few. Liberal institutions, stuck in their ivory towers, largely overlook the fact that the churches they lionize in Latin America-Protestant congregations that express their solidarity with the poor-are mainly evangelical in theology. It is not without significance that Stoll has found most of his cases of evangelical participation in social transformation in regions such as Central America, the Andean republics, Brazil and Chile, where conservative churches are strong, and not in those countries where liberal denominations are active.

Stoll makes reference to "the immense social power in those praying masses of believers." As early as 1980, Brazilian Marxist sociologist Carlos Rodrigues-Brandao, after in-depth field research,

pointed out (in Os Deuses do Povo, or "The Gods of the People") the latent revolutionary potential in "small sect" Pentecostalism. This movement of "the poor of the earth," he suggested, was perhaps better prepared than the Catholic base communities to confront the evils of society because Pentecostals see themselves as engaged in a holy war, and are buoyed by a hope of "a final struggle that will recreate a social order." When Pentecostals become more politically aware, they can become a potest force for change. "Their active belief to supernatural forces is not escapism, but a source of hope in their struggle to change their environment." Brandao argues cogently that popular religion, of whatever kind, is not an apolitical phenomenon. "In its own way, it is a grassroots struggle to regain a degree of freedom from the domination of more structured religious forms."

On the basis of both firsthand observation and reputable sociological studies, Stoll, along with Martin, has found little evidence of upward social mobility among the rank and file of grass-roots evangelicalism. Whatever upward pull there may have been in the past is being

canceled out by Protestant inroads among the impoverished masses. Quoting Lalive d'Epinay's groundbreaking study of Chilean Pentecostalism, Stoll notes that the locus of Protestant growth and social involvement is the family, whereas Marxism focuses on the workplace. To the extent that the base communities fit into the latter model, this it sight may explain a fact that has long troubled me: the short "shelf-life" of the base communities, compared to the continuity and numerical growth of Protestant congregations. When they seem to achieve the goals of their struggle, or when the issues become fuzzy during periods of political "distention" and "democratization," the base communities often experience a crisis of identity. On the other hand, the family orientation of evangelical churches makes for long-term stability and provides linkages for growth throughout extended family networks. I have written elsewhere on the Catholic base communitics as the hope of the church. What I could not foresce is that the major beneficiaries of their vision of social transformation may turn out to be grass-roots Protestant churches and a new breed of

ecumenical base communities. Their apologists have always insisted that the base communities were expendable: they should die and be resurrected as a new church of the poor. Is it conceivable that Pentecostal congregations will become a part of this new church, working toward the transformation of Latin America? Stoll asks, "Could the surprising evangelical groundswell affect the course of events in Latin America?" It is too early to make a definitive judgment.

Both Stoll and Martin are fairly bullish on evangelicalism/Pentecostalism. But the movement's potential for social transformation will be achieved to the degree in which it allows itself to be leavened by base-church values. There are faint signs of hope throughout evangelicalism. A recent consultation convened by an institution hostile to liberation theology produced a document that expressed appreciation for the challenge of this movement to the evangelical faith.

THE THIRD BOOK on our list is further evidence that evangelicals cannot be neatly labeled. Emilio Núñez, a Salvadoran theologian and the author of a

-4-

book on liberation theology, and William Taylor, the son of missionaries, move in conservative evangelical circles. Read with these facts in mind, their work may come as a surprise. It has already merited them criticism from the ultraconservative wing of their own constituency because of their irenic approach to liberation the-

Evangelicals' emphasis on the family makes for stability and growth.

ology and their concern for justice issues. The book is, in fact, two treatises with an introduction and a conclusion. The authors evidence a degree of difference in their perspectives, perhaps because of their different national origins.

Part one is a mildly analytical description by Taylor of the social and religious dimensions of the crisis in Latin America. Núñez devotes part two to a discussion of crucial issues that Latin American evangelicals must face. After a brief look at the "Hispano-American" religious ethos, he

deals critically and sympathetically with postconciliar Catholicism's scarch for renewal—liberation theology and the charismatic movement—and its resistance to change. He further addresses, theologically and historically, the growing evangelical search for gospel contextualization and the movement's gradual awakening to social responsibility.

In a concluding essay, Taylor pleads for "a complete and integrated gospel that deals with the fundamental alienation of man from God, an alienation that splinters all the relationships man sustains: those to God, to himself and to others." Within the Latin American Theological Fraternity, to which Núñez, Taylor and I belong, most members would probably agree with the substance of this book. Others could wish that the authors had been more daring in their analysis. But that is just the point. Evangelicalism spans a wide spectrum. We are united primarily by our unswerving belief in the authority and transforming power of Scripture. Despite our differences, it is this fact that makes evangelicalism a social and religious force to be reckoned with in Latin America. 12

Surging evangelicals experience growing pains—inside and out

Protestants in Central and South America are beginning to flex their spiritual and political muscles, but occasional cramps are still a problem.

By Paul Pretiz

"Holy war" in Peru

In Peru, the landslide June victory of Alberto Fujimori, a Catholic, was a test of Peru's willingness to let Fujimori's team—with 17 evangelicals-take the reins of the economically devastated country. (See PULSE, Nov. 9.) One press report called the runoff electoral campaign a "holy war" after Catholics took images of their saints into a street procession-an act usually reserved for impending disasters—as a warning against Protestant enthusiasm.

Opposition in Mexico

A more serious confrontation occurred in February when a mob attacked a group of evangelicals praying on a hillside for Mexico City (see PULSE, March 9, June 22). The incident led to a first-ever meeting of evangelical leaders with a Mexican president, Salinas de Gortari, who was sympathetic.

Thereafter, most references to evangelicals in the media have been positive. Traditionally the Mexican press has called all Protestant groups "sects."

Grudging recognition

David Stoll recognizes the growing evangelical presence in his recent book, Is Latin America Turning Protestant? (University of California Press, Berkeley) The author, not an evangelical, attempts to link the region's growing Protestant movement to the U.S. political right; but he concludes, perhaps reluctantly, that Latin America's evangelicals cannot be explained by an artificial injection of U.S. dollars.

Harnessing missionary interest Miami-based Latin America Mission's Christ for the City (CFC) program is harnessing the awakening missionary interest in Latin America. While incorporating long-term Costa Rican missionaries, the effort has had unexpected success using shorttermers as well.

Visas for Latin Americans are sometimes as hard to get as visas for North American personnel—perhaps even harder. Work permits (for "tentmaking" ministries) and student visas may be as difficult to come by as a U.S. green card. But Costa Ricans have been more than willing to raise their own travel funds, take leave of jobs and pastorates, or sacrifice university vacations for up to a month. Says John Huffman, CFC director, 'They are not a threat to a local pastor in the receiving country, who might resent a more permanently located Costa Rican opening a new church down the street.'

Source of encouragement

Pastors especially welcome other pastors, not only because of the new arrivals' ministry skills, but also because of the encouragement the locals

1900 1925	50,000 756,000	Evangelicals Evangelicals	Evangelical Growth	
1936	7.2 million	Evangelicals	L	
1970	16 million 75,000 60,000	Evangelicals Churches Leaders without formal equipping		
1989	40 million 225,000 175,000	Evangelicals Churches Leaders without formal equipping		
2000	100 million	Lotinate rel	lam Taylor, executive sec- ary, Missions Commission, rid Evangelical Fellowship	

can get through mutual discussion and prayer in the midst of their sometimes discouraging situations. Costa Rican pastors serving in Medellín, Colombia, have inspired pastors there to start work in other Colombian cities.

Just as a short-term experience often confirms a call to missions for North Americans, these teams have encouraged many Latin Americans to consider career service. Costa Ricans have made 140 trips to Mexico and Colombia under the CFC program. Because Colombia's drug war has contributed to the exodus from Medellín of many U.S. workers, the Latin American short-termers have been especially valuable.

Growing problem: nominalism In the midst of occasional confrontation and violence, Latin American evangelical growth now faces a new challenge-nominalism. Research by Visión Evangélica Latinoamericana (VELA), Mexico City, suggests that the small evangelical church there may be suffering from this malady. VELA's director says the churches and denominations have reported about 250,000 evangelicals, slightly more than one percent of the metropolitan population. Government figures, however, list over two percent as "Protestant."


Part of the difference is because the government labels as Protestant groups such as the Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses. Another reason could be that small churches simply escaped the attention of VELA's re-

searchers. A strong possibility is that a movement existing for well over a century has left in its wake some in each generation who are no longer committed to the church or Christ. But when a census-taker comes to the door, these people will never identify themselves as anything but Protestant. Studies in Costa Rica also point to more defections than expected. Paul Pretiz, a missionary in Latin America for 37 years, works in San Jose, Costa Rica.

PULSE (USI'S 723-970) is published semi-monthly by Evangelical Missions Information Service, 25W560 Geneva Rd., Box 794, Wheaton, IL 60189, Telephone (706) 653-2158. FAX: (708) 653-0520. December 28, 1990, Vol. 25, No. 24. EDITORIAL STAFF: Jim Reapsome, San Guthrie, Sharon Mumper, Dona Dehl, Jennifer Owen. CIRCULATION: Karen Rummel. SUBSCRIPTION RATES One year (24 issues) \$24,95. AIR MAIL 544,95. Second class postage paid at Wheaton, IL, and additional mailing offices. The information in PULSE is for the use of paid subscribers only, and cannot be reprinted or used in any other media without written permission. POSTMASTER Send address charges to Pulse, Box 794, Wheaton, IL 60189. Reprinted by permission from PULSE. (December 28, 1990 issue, p.3)



÷



-- From Patrick Johnson Operation World, 1986

WARD BUILD

and the second second

Country	Page No.	Prayer Calendar day of month	Population in thousands	Evangelicals in thousands
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Falkland Islands Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay	91 108 112 135 145 151 162 166 172 200 209 297 319 335 340 342 440	$ \begin{array}{r} 1-2\\ 3-4\\ 5-7\\ 8-9\\ 10-11\\ 12\\ 13-14\\ 15-16\\ 17-18\\ 17-18\\ 19\\ 20-21\\ 22-23\\ 24\\ 25\\ 24\\ 25\\ 26-27\\ 28\\ \end{array} $	$\begin{array}{r} 30,600\\ 6,200\\ 138,400\\ 12,000\\ 29,400\\ 2,600\\ 9,400\\ 5,500\\ 3\\ 8,403\\ 4,372\\ 80,484\\ 3,218\\ 2,140\\ 3,600\\ 19,500\\ \end{array}$	$ \begin{array}{r} 1,438 \\ 403 \\ 22,144 \\ 2,592 \\ 706 \\ 169 \\ 301 \\ 704 \\ - \\ 1,597 \\ 385 \\ 2,495 \\ 203 \\ 210 \\ 90 \\ 585 \\ \end{array} $

complacent. Early converts from Catholicism said that "there are few whom they know in the Roman Catholic Church who know the facts of Christ's life and fewer still who know Christ."¹³ Robert Speer wrote in 1913, "The very crucifixes of which South America is full misrepresent the Gospel;"¹⁴ he went on to note that "even the dead Christ is the subordinate figure. The central place is Mary's."¹⁵ The gospel simply was not being preached by the Catholic Church in the early part of this century, and thus Catholic claims that Latin America was Christian were invalid.

The view that Latin America is no longer in need of missionaries, or even evangelists, has been challenged by both Catholics and ecumenically minded Christians since the 1950s. At the 1953 Catholic Action Congress in Chimbote, Peru, some 300 Catholics from throughout the continent reached the conclusion that "the vast majority are only...nominal Catholics."¹⁶ Likewise from the ecumenical side, Julio de Santa Ana wrote, "Latin America remains a mission field."¹⁷ Not surprisingly, this conclusion has also been reached by evangelicals like Samuel Escobar, who calls Latin America "a pagan continent with a thin veneer of Christianity."¹⁸ Thus there is widespread agreement today that the task of preaching the good news of Jesus Christ has not been accomplished in Latin America.

Why not then make common cause with the Roman Catholic Church to reach the continent for Christ? Why not work hand in hand to bring the gospel, instead of fighting hand to hand over issues that divide the Catholic from the Protestant Church? The answer to this type of question depends upon one's answer to the question, "Has the Catholic Church changed for the better in Latin America since the early 1900s?" In other words, have the divisive issues that led to the Reformation and led Protestant missionaries to enter Latin America in significant numbers since the turn of the century been resolved? The evang licals and Pentecostals have answered, "No." The abuses that gave rise to the Reformation have not been corrected, and new ones - such as the dogma of the corporal assumption of Mary, promulgated in 1950 - have been created. The literally millions of converts from Catholicism to Protestant Christianity are nearly unanimous in this verdict. 1

There is, however, a vocal minority of Protestants involved in the ecumenical movement in Latin America who disagree. Miguel Bonino, called by C. Rene Padilla "perhaps the most outstanding Latin American Protestant theologian today," 19 wrote in 1969 that one now meets "a wholly new Catholicism, a Catholicism that is cleansed of Marian excesses, evangelized, more biblical."²⁰ The vast majority of Latin American Protestants would disagree, pointing to endemic Mariolatry, sacramentalism, papal infallibility, worship of images, prayers for the dead and to the saints, and the entire "sacrifice of the Mass" as reason enough to deny any substantial change in the Catholic Church since the Reformation. Indeed, even the immediate cause of Martin Luther's protest - the granting of indulgences from punishment in purgatory - has continued to be an integral part of the Catholic faith. 21 001 :- 8 '86

Bonino responds to those who express their doubt that the Catholic Church has in fact changed: "People who think thus